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June 13, 2006
Ms. Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Re: State v. Seruka Tillaia, No. 20041030-CA
Utah R. App. R. 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Collins:
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites United
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35,fflf37-38
(June 6, 2006), in support of the State's argument that defendant is obligated to marshal
fact-dependent rulings irrespective of the standard of review on appeal. See Brief of
Appellee at 17-24 & 32-35. This letter is submitted in response to defendant's argument
that he need not marshal when a ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Reply
Brief of Appellant at 2.
This matter is set for oral argument tomorrow morning, Wednesday, June 14,
2006, at 9:30 a.m. The State requests that this letter and the attached decision be
distributed to the Court as supplemental authority.
Sincerely,

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
enclosure
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT
LAW
REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Supreme Court of Utah.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., a Delaware
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS, a Netherlands association; Stichting
Mayflower Recreational Fonds, a general
partnership; Stichting Mayflower
Recreation; Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc., a
Utah corporation; Royal
Street of Utah; Cooperative Centrale
Raiffeisenboerenleenbank, B.A., a
Netherlands corporation; May Finance C.V.; Deer
Valley Resort, Inc., a Nevada
corporation; and Newpark Resources, Inc., a
Nevada corporation, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 20040943.
June 6, 2006.
Fourth District, Heber Dep't; No. 000500087; The
Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
Laura S. Scott, Michael P. Petrogeorge, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff.
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for appellants
Wendy A. Faber, Salt Lake City, for defendant Deer
Valley Resort.
Casey K. McGarvey, Salt Lake City, for defendant
Newpark Resources.
PARRISH, Justice:

*1 1f 1 Tlris case stems from the application of a
much-favored property right: a cotenant's right to
partition. Partition is intended to broker peace
between feuding cotenants and promote the
productive use of property. The scarcity of relevant
case law is perhaps a reflection of the effectiveness
and wisdom of the remedy. Nevertheless, a judicial
partition can sometimes breed further contention
and dissatisfaction. This is one such case.
Tf 2 Appellants Stichting Mayflower Mountain
Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds
(collectively, "Mayflower") challenge the trial
court's partition of certain property located in
Summit
and
Wasatch
Counties
and
an
accompanying award of owelty. Mayflower
contends that appellee United Park City Mines
Company ("United Park") waived its right to
partition and that it was therefore error for the trial
court to order the partition. Alternatively,
Mayflower argues that the trial court erred in its
calculation of the owelty award and its refusal to
order an accounting.
U 3 We reject Mayflower's challenge to the trial
court's ruling because Mayflower has failed to
marshal the evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result,
we assume that the evidence supports the factual
findings underlying the ruling. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
A. The Properties
U 4 United Park and Mayflower
own
approximately 342 acres of property (the "Partition
Property") as tenants in common. The Partition
Property is comprised of certain patented mining
claims located in the Uintah Mining District.
Approximately 216 acres of the Partition Property
lie in Summit County; the remaining acres are
located in Wasatch County. The Partition Property
is located in an area commonly known as "Upper
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Mountain."
f 5 Additionally, United Park and Mayflower
each separately own nearby properties. United Park
owns approximately 1400 acres of property located
in Summit County (the "United Park Property").
Part of the United Park Property is an 84-acre
parcel termed "Mountain Village," which is located
in an area commonly known as "Lower Mountain."
Another part of the United Park Property is a
portion of the "Northside Neighborhood," a planned
63-acre development in Upper Mountain. United
Park and Deer Valley Resort Company ("Deer
Valley") are the two main Northside Neighborhood
property owners; three others also own interests in
the Northside Neighborhood, including Mayflower.
Mayflower solely owns approximately 50 to 60
acres of Summit County property (the "Mayflower
Property").
B. The Annexation and Development Agreement
% 6 United Park has long sought to develop the
United Park Property. But Summit County zoning
regulations, which permitted only one unit of
development per 40 acres, prevented large-scale
development. In 1994, United Park petitioned Park
City for annexation of approximately 1340 acres of
land located in Summit County, seeking a
regulatory framework more conducive to its
development goals. Thus began a long and difficult
negotiation process that ultimately culminated in
United Park's partition petition.
*2 1f 7 Park City allegedly responded to United
Park's 1994 petition by insisting on two conditions
to annexation: (1) that the annexation extend to the
Summit County line and cover property owned by
several different owners, including the United Park
Property, the Mayflower Property, and the portion
of the Partition Property lying within Summit
County (collectively, the "Flagstaff Development");
and (2) that the Flagstaff Development be subject to
a
master
development
agreement
(the
"Development Agreement") regulating its use and
development. United Park continued negotiating
with Park City for over four years. United Park and
Park City particularly struggled over how much
development density to allocate to the Mountain

Village and Northside Neighborhood developments.
None of the other property owners ever participated
in the negotiation process, nor did they bear the
associated expenses.
K 8 In 1997, the Park City planning commission
approved United Park's proposal, which called for
development in both the Upper Mountain and
Lower Mountain areas. The city council, however,
rejected the proposal and passed a resolution
restricting development to Lower Mountain.
Frustrated,
United
Park
initiated
parallel
negotiations with Summit County for a deal that
would amend that County's restrictive zoning
regulations. Park City resumed negotiations with
United Park shortly thereafter, and in 1998, the city
council passed a resolution allowing for
development on Upper Mountain. The annexation
and the Development Agreement were both
finalized on June 24, 1999.
U 9 The Development Agreement permits 470
residences, 16 single-family lots, and commercial
development
in
Mountain
Village.
The
Development Agreement also allows for the
development of up to 38 single-family lots in the
Northside Neighborhood. Under the Development
Agreement, United Park and Deer Valley are
collectively entitled to 30 lots in the Northside
Neighborhood. The Development Agreement also
authorizes 8 additional Northside Neighborhood
lots (the "Conditional Lots"), but only in the event
that the other three property owners, including
Mayflower, elect to join in the Development
Agreement. According to the Development
Agreement, all development is to take place within
discrete "development pods"; the majority of the
Flagstaff
Development—
approximately
1500
acres—is zoned as "recreational open space."
1f 10 Approximately 3.5 acres of the Partition
Property (the "Adjacent Property") are located
adjacent to both the proposed subdivision within the
Northside Neighborhood and the Mayflower
Property. The Mayflower Property is also located
adjacent to the proposed subdivision within the
Northside Neighborhood. The portion of the
Partition Property located in Wasatch County was
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not annexed and is not subject to the Development
Agreement.
f 11 United Park made significant concessions as
part of the Development Agreement. In exchange
for enhanced development rights in the United Park
Property and the Northside Neighborhood, United
Park agreed not to develop (1) an approximately
650-acre parcel in Summit County commonly
known as "Richardson Flats"; (2) an approximately
90-acre parcel located at the top of Iron Mountain;
and (3) a parcel commonly known as "Prospect
Ridge." United Park also agreed to "offer to
dedicate to the City a conservation easement[ ] or
deed" in order to preserve several parking lots
located near City Hall. United Park was also forced
to "ratchet down its proposed density" for its
development of an approximately 1500-acre parcel
in Wasatch County commonly known as "Bonanza
Flats ." Additionally, United Park committed to
operating private shuttle services within Mountain
Village, as well as undertaking multi-million dollar
road construction and renovation projects. As part
of the Development Agreement, Park City acquired
a conservation easement over 1,000-plus acres of
property owned solely by United Park. United Park
also agreed to either construct a gondola between
the Flagstaff Mountain Resort and old town Park
City or, if Park City demanded, pay one million
dollars to Park City.
C. The United Park-Mayflower Relationship
*3 1f 12 Throughout its negotiations with Park
City, United Park attempted to get Mayflower and
the other Flagstaff Development property owners to
participate in a joint venture. These efforts
ultimately were unsuccessful. On February 25,
1997, Hank Rothwell, the president of United Park,
faxed a letter (the "1997 Letter") to Mayflower
stating, "United Park or its representatives, will not
annex [Mayflower's] property or accept a density
approval for [Mayflower's] property without
[Mayflower's] notification and permission." The
1997 Letter was purportedly "reconfirmed" on
March 20, 1997. Discussions between United Park
and Mayflower continued, and on September 3,
1998, Mayflower advised Park City in writing that
it objected to the terms of the annexation. United

Park grew increasingly frustrated by Mayflower's
refusal to participate in any kind of joint venture,
and on January 21, 1999, Rothwell sent a letter to
Mayflower advising that United Park would "delete
Mayflower property from [the] Master Planning
effort."
If 13 The annexation was finalized on June 24,
1999, pursuant to Park City Ordinance No. 99-30.
Although unilateral, the annexation petition was
proper under Utah Code section 10-2-403(b) (1999)
, which requires that a petition be signed by the
owner or owners of "a majority of the private land
area within the area proposed for annexation" that is
"equal in value to at least 1/3 of the value of all
private real property within the area proposed for
annexation ." Because United Park was the
undisputed majority property owner, its petition met
these requirements.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1 14 In February 2000, United Park filed a
complaint seeking partition of the Partition
Property. As part of the partition process, the trial
court appointed three referees to investigate the
issues relevant to the partition and to produce a
report recommending how the Partition Property
should be divided. Each party chose one referee;
those two referees in turn selected a third neutral
referee.
% 15 Over the course of several months, the
referees reviewed the history of the annexation
process and the resulting Development Agreement.
The referees first focused their efforts on deciding
how best to physically divide the Partition Property;
they then investigated Mayflower's claims that the
Development Agreement had resulted in a transfer
of development density from the Partition Property
and the Mayflower Property to Mountain Village
and the Northside Neighborhood. The referees
submitted their reports in April 2001. The neutral
referee and the United Park referee signed the
majority conclusions and recommendations (the
"Majority Report"), while the Mayflower referee
submitted a separate, dissenting report (the
"Minority Report").
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If 16 The Majority Report recommended that the
Partition Property be divided so that United Park
and Mayflower each receive approximately 108
acres in Summit County and roughly 63 acres in
Wasatch County. Additionally, the Majority Report
proposed that Mayflower be granted the Adjacent
Property as part of its 108-acre Summit County
allotment.
The
Majority
Report
further
recommended that the trial court award Mayflower
3 or 4 of the Conditional Lots. According to the
Majority Report, this award would compensate
Mayflower for density that was "probably relocated
from the [Partition Property and the Mayflower
Property] and clustered into the Northside
Neighborhood." In making this recommendation,
the authors of the Majority Report stated that they
were "convinced that the density in the Flagstaff
Development gained from the [Partition Property]
and from [the Mayflower Property] is limited to
Mayflower's fair portion of the [Conditional Lots]
in the Northside Neighborhood."
*4 U 17 The Minority Report did not dispute the
Majority Report's proposed physical partition of the
Partition Property. It disagreed with the Majority
Report, however, as to how many of the Conditional
Lots Mayflower should be awarded. The Minority
Report found that density may have been
transferred to Mountain Village from the Partition
Property. According to the Minority Report's
calculations, Mayflower was possibly entitled to a
total of 7.85 to 8.1 lots.
U 18 In March 2002, Mayflower amended its
answer in the partition lawsuit to allege that United
Park, through the 1997 Letter, had waived its right
to partition the Partition Property. Both parties filed
unsuccessful summary judgment motions in late
2002. In May 2004, the court held a bench trial and
subsequently issued a ruling adopting the
recommendations of the Majority Report. The trial
court issued amended findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and an order in October 2004, and
Mayflower timely appealed. This court initially
transferred the appeal to the court of appeals but
subsequently vacated the transfer order and recalled
the case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code section 78-2-2(3)0) (2002).

ANALYSIS
If 19 Our holding in this case is but the latest in a
series of warning signs we must occasionally post
for unsuspecting or overly clever parties. The
following analysis should serve as frank, severe
instruction for those parties who ask us to decide
fact-dependent questions under the guise that they
present only issues of law.
K 20 While Mayflower purports to raise a
multitude of issues in its briefs, the substance of this
case can actually be distilled into two discrete
questions: (1) whether the trial court erred in
determining that United Park did not waive its right
to partition; and (2) whether the trial court abused
its discretion in fashioning the owelty award.
Mayflower also requests an accounting. Because we
conclude that Mayflower's claim for an accounting
is duplicative of its request for an additional owelty
award, we refuse to consider that claim. We
therefore focus on the questions of waiver and
owelty and discuss each in turn.
I. WAIVER
f 21 Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a
mixed question of law and fact. Chen v. Stewart,
2004 UT 82, \ 23, 100 P.3d 1177; see also U.S.
Realty 86 Assocs. v. Sec. Inv., Ltd., 2002 UT 14, ^
11, 40 P.3d 586. As we explained in Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 16, 982 P.2d 572,
"[W]hether the trial court employed the proper
standard of waiver presents a legal question which
is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events
allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature
and should be reviewed as factual determinations."
Accordingly, we "grant broadened discretion to the
trial court's findings" when reviewing questions of
waiver. Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 23.
K 22 We have repeatedly applied the rule clarified
in Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993), when
evaluating questions of waiver. "A waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right,
benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence,
and an intention to relinquish it." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also In re Flake, 2003
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UT 17, If 30, 71 P.3d 589. Questions of waiver
often hinge on the critical third element of intent.
We have explained that the intent to relinquish a
right must be distinct and that fact-finders should
"look[ ] at the totality of the circumstances" in
discerning intent. Id.
*5 1| 23 Mayflower argues that United Park
waived its right to seek a partition of the property.
And there is no dispute that the first two elements of
waiver were satisfied here: United Park had the
right to a partition and was aware of that right.
Accordingly, the existence of a waiver turns on the
question of intent. On this point, the trial court
found that "United Park ha [d] not waived its right
to parrition[;][t]he [1997 Letter] ... did not evidence
an intent by United Park to waive its right to
partition." Because the issue of intent is
determinative here, Mayflower must successfully
challenge this factual finding if we are to reverse the
trial court's ruling. This requires that Mayflower
marshal all the evidence supporting that finding.
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). Because Mayflower has
failed to do so, we assume that the evidence
supports the finding and consequently affirm.
K 24 Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires "[a] party challenging a fact
finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." See also State v.
Clark, 2005 UT 75, 1f 17, 124 P.3d 235; Wilson
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, U
21, 54 P.3d 1177. To pass this threshold, parties
protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the finding even when viewing it in a
light most favorable to the court below." Clark,
2005 UT 75, K 17 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
If 25 That waiver is a mixed question of law and
fact does not relieve Mayflower of this important
task. "Even where the defendants purport to
challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a
determination of the correctness of a court's
application of a legal standard is extremely
fact-sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty to

marshal the evidence." Chen, 2004 UT 82, If 20.
Mayflower cannot dodge this duty by attempting to
frame the issues as legal ones. Because the question
of waiver is so dependent on factual findings,
Mayflower must marshal the evidence if it seeks to
challenge the trial court's determination of that
question.
^ 26 Mayflower has not done so. It ostensibly
makes an effort to marshal the evidence on pages
21-22 of its brief: "It marshals the evidence ... to
present the [1997 Letter] and testimony [of one
witness]." But contrary to Mayflower's wistful
assertion, presenting evidence supporting the
challenged conclusion does not satisfy the
marshaling requirement. Parties cannot discharge
their duty by "simply providing] an exhaustive
review of all evidence presented at trial." Chen,
2004 UT 82, If 77. Rather, parties are required to
"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and
fully embrace the adversary's position"; [they]
must play the "devil's advocate." In so doing,
appellants must present the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court and not attempt
to construe the evidence in a light favorable to
their case.... In sum, to properly marshal the
evidence the challenging party must demonstrate
how the court found the facts from the evidence
and then explain why those findings contradict
the clear weight of the evidence.
*6 Id. If 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT
108, Tf 19, 57 P.3d 1093) (citations omitted). What
Mayflower has done instead is "merely re-argue the
factual case ... presented in the trial court," id. If
77, leaving United Park and this court to bear the
expense and time of performing the critical task of
marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient,
and unacceptable. See id.
f 27 We repeatedly have warned of the grim
consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill
the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to
perform this critical task, we can rely on that failure
to affirm the lower court's findings of fact. Id. ^f
80; see also Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17. We
therefore affirm the trial court's factual findings,
including its determination that United Park did not
intend to waive its right to partition. Because we

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://web2.westlaw.co^

06/13/2006

Page 7 of9

2006 W L 1528607

Page 6

._. p.3d — , 2006 W L 1528607 (Utah), 2006 U T 35
(Cite as: 2006 W L 1528607 (Utah))
accept that finding of fact, we must also affirm the
trial court's conclusion that United Park did not
waive its right to partition.
II. OWELTY
If 28 Because this court has rarely reviewed
owelty awards, we understand both parties'
confusion as to the applicable standard of review.
We therefore pause to clarify the correct standard.
The owelty remedy, though enabled by statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-39-41 (2002), is an equitable form
of relief. The statute itself recognizes the equitable
nature of owelty: it empowers courts "to make
compensatory adjustment among the parties
according to the principles of equity." Id. (emphasis
added). This is consistent with our characterization
of partition, which we have held to be "an equitable
action," in part because "[t]he fundamental
objective in a partition action is to divide the
property so as to be fair and equitable and confer
no unfair advantage on any of the co-tenants."
Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah
1984) (emphasis added). We therefore review
awards of owelty as we do other forms of equitable
relief.
If 29 In equity cases, we review the trial court's
legal conclusions for correctness. RHN Corp. v.
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, H 35, 96 P.3d 935. We grant
considerable deference to the trial court's factual
findings and will not reverse those findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. Id.
1f 30 The equitable distribution of property,
however, involves more than factual findings and
legal conclusions: it requires trial courts to "balance
[ ] the relative significance of the facts and
applicable law in order to achieve a fair and
equitable result. This balancing requires the
exercise of discretion." Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005
UT 22, 1f 23, 112 P.3d 495. In partition actions,
trial courts are specifically "accorded broad
discretion in fashioning an appropriate decree."
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1982).
We will affirm a trial court's exercise of that broad
discretion unless it was abused. Id.
\ 31 Owelty is a remedy sometimes awarded in

conjunction with a partition order. When a partition
cannot be made without "great prejudice" to a
cotenant, the trial court, by statute, is permitted to
order a sale of the property. Utah Code Ann. §
78-39-1 (2002). Owelty is an equitable alternative
to this often undesirable result. Under Utah Code
section 78-39-41, a court can go forward with the
partition and award owelty to a prejudiced party in
order to compensate for any inequality suffered by
that party. In the past, this court has expressed a
preference that trial courts award owelty rather than
forcing a sale. See Clawson v. Silver, 2001 UT 42,
1fl[ 11, 12, 26 P.3d 209. We reemphasize this
preference: "a public sale should be a last resort,"
especially in cases where "both [parties] desire to
retain an interest" in the property to be partitioned.
Id If 12.
*7 Tf 32 Mayflower does not contest the trial
court's actual physical division of the Partition
Property. Rather, it challenges the owelty award,
contending that the 4 Conditional Lots awarded by
the trial court do not sufficiently compensate it for
the prejudicial impact of the partition. Because
Mayflower has failed to marshal the evidence
supporting the owelty award, however, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
T| 33 The trial court undertook an intensive factual
inquiry in determining the owelty award. Pursuant
to section 78-39-41, the trial court was required to
determine whether the partition could be made
"equally among the parties ... without prejudice to
the rights and interests o f Mayflower. This was
clearly a question of fact. See Clawson, 2001 UT
42, If 10 ("Whether ... a partition can be made
without great prejudice to the owners is a question
of fact." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
If 34 The partition order entered by the trial court
included the award of owelty in the form of the 4
Conditional Lots that had been recommended by the
Majority Report, thus reflecting the trial court's
conclusion that an equal partition could not be
achieved absent an award of some additional
compensation to Mayflower. In reaching this
conclusion, the trial court reviewed the voluminous
record,
which includes witness
testimony,
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transcripts of city meetings, and the Majority and
Minority Reports, and concluded that Mayflower
had failed to "present any evidence that the physical
division of the Partition Property recommended by
the [majority] referees is not fair or equitable." The
trial court then had to "adjudge compensation" that
would remedy any "inequality" resulting from the
partition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41. This task
again required that the trial court survey the record
and consider issues of fact.

award. When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive
use of its discretionary powers, they "must
successfully challenge the factual findings upon
which the trial court's decision ... depended." Chen
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, n. 14, 100 P.3d 1177. This
requires that parties marshal the evidence. As we
have previously explained, parties who ask this
court to consider fact-sensitive questions—including
those questions reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard-have a duty to marshal all the
evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's
ruling. See id. (holding that parties had a duty to
marshal the evidence when challenging the
appointment of an interim CEO, a question
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).

Tf 35 First, the trial court had to determine the
extent of the inequality to be remedied by the
owelty award. The court specifically focused on
whether any density had been transferred from the
Partition Property or the Mayflower Property to
Mountain Village or the Northside Neighborhood.
While the trial court apparently agreed with the
Majority Report's conclusion that some density was
"probably" transferred "from the [Partition Property
and the Mayflower Property] and clustered into the
Northside Neighborhood," it otherwise found that
"no evidence was produced as a basis for
[Mayflower's] claims for relief." Thus, like the
drafters of the Majority Report, it was "convinced
that the density in the Flagstaff Development gained
from the [Partition Property] and from [the
Mayflower Property] [was] limited to Mayflower's
fair portion of the [Conditional Lots] in the
Northside Neighborhood."

If 38 We reaffirm the deliberate, clear instruction
found in our prior decisions regarding the
marshaling obligation and emphasize that the labels
given particular issues by courts or counsel are not
determinative. Rather, the critical
element
triggering the duty to marshal is factual inquiry.
Parties seeking appellate review must marshal the
evidence on those questions that require substantive
factual inquiry, regardless of whether those
questions are reviewed for clear error or abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, this court will not question a
lower court's factual analysis and will instead
assume that the evidence supports the challenged
findings.

K 36 In addition to considering evidence
concerning the alleged density transfers, the trial
court had to consider the amount of compensation
necessary to achieve a fair and equitable partition.
This again required that the trial court consider the
evidence presented, including the recommendations
and calculations in the Majority and Minority
Reports. The trial court ultimately decided that it
would be appropriate to award Mayflower 4 of the
Conditional Lots in order to offset the inequality
produced by the probable transfer of density to the
Northside Neighborhood.

T[ 39 In challenging the owelty award, Mayflower
had a duty to marshal all of the evidence supporting
the award, including evidence relevant to the
questions
of
inequality
and
appropriate
compensation. Even if the challenged ruling did not
specifically reference all such evidence, Mayflower
was nevertheless required to present "every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings [it] resists." Id. ^ 77.
This enables the reviewing court to evaluate
fact-centric arguments in the context of the entire
body of evidence.

*8 K 37 This examination of the issues of
prejudice,
inequality,
and
compensation
undergirded the trial court's eventual exercise of its
discretionary powers in fashioning the owelty

% 40 Mayflower has shirked that responsibility
here. It has neither corralled the evidence
supporting the compensation calculation of the trial
court nor reviewed the evidence relating to the
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alleged density transfers "in a light most favorable
to the trial court." Id. ^ 78. Instead, Mayflower has
cobbled together disjointed
arguments and
repeatedly highlighted and restated only that
evidence favorable to its position.
U 41 Because Mayflower has not properly
challenged the factual basis underlying the owelty
award, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion. We therefore affirm the trial
court's award of owelty.
III. ACCOUNTING
% 42 Finally, Mayflower argues that the trial court
erred by not requiring United Park to account for
profits it received as a result of the annexation. We
decline to analyze this claim on the ground that it is
duplicative of Mayflower's claim for owelty.
Indeed, the accounting claim hinges on the same
familiar question of fact: whether the alleged
transfers of density actually occurred. And the
amount awarded under either remedy would be
shaped by the same consideration: the benefits or
profits received by United Park as a result of the
alleged density transfers.

review; it instead springs when an evaluation of the
record is central to the task confronting the
reviewing court.
If 45 While this duty may seem to place appellants
in the disadvantageous position of advocating the
arguments they seek to rebut, it may often have the
unexpected benefit of bolstering the cogency of the
arguments they actually advance. Additionally, and
more importantly, fairness and judicial economy
compel us to vigorously enforce the threshold
marshaling requirement found in rule 24(a)(9).
Because Mayflower has not met this threshold, we
must assume that the evidence supports the factual
findings underlying the trial court's decision and
therefore affirm.
U 46 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT and Judge
QUINN concur in Justice PARRISH'S opinion.
If 47 Having disqualified himself, Justice
NEHRING does not participate herein; District
Court Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN sat.
P.3d — , 2006 WL 1528607 (Utah), 2006 UT

*9 f 43 Furthermore, because the resolution of
Mayflower's request for an accounting hinges on a
question of fact, Mayflower has a corresponding
duty to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings on that question. As explained
above, Mayflower has failed to do so and therefore
has not effectively demonstrated that the trial court
erred in failing to order an accounting.

35
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
^ 44 Unless appellants marshal the evidence
relevant to fact-dependent questions, they risk
having their appeals rejected without consideration
of those questions. Despite this frequently repeated
counsel, parties sometimes attempt a second bite at
the factual apple without first fulfilling this
well-established duty. This tactic may be
particularly appealing when a party attempts, as
Mayflower has done here, to characterize the issues
as issues of law that are not reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. The duty is not,
however, contingent on labels and standards of
> 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.
SERUKATILIAIA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo. 20041030-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from his convictions for murder, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1 )(a) (West 2004);
aggravated assault with use of a dangerous weapon, a third degree felony, in violation of
section 76-5-103(l)(b); and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-over provision).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly bar Marco Etsitty from testifying after defendant failed
to disclose that Etsitty would be a defense witness, even though the defense had subpoenaed
him weeks before trial? Alternatively, has defendant established that his counsel was
ineffective for choosing not to designate Etsitty as a defense witness prior to trial?

A trial court's decision to sanction a party's noncompliance with a pretrial discovery
order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413-414
(1988) (recognizing a trial court's discretion to exclude a witness as a sanction for
noncompliance with a discovery order); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081,1084-85 (Utah App.
1998) (same). See also State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, \ 8,76 P.3d 1165 (reviewing a trial
court's exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion).
When an allegation of ineffective counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, a
defendant must prove as a matter of law that his trial counsel's performance "was deficient
in that it 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah
App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that a bystander's out-of-court statement to
defense witness Isaac Martinez was inadmissible hearsay?
"Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, [the appellate
court] review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of
discretion." Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ^ 8.
3. Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial misconduct when he summarized Lindsay
Isakson's testimony during closing argument?
A claim of error will be considered for the first time on appeal only if defendant
establishes that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object and/or that the trial court
plainly erred in sua sponte correcting the error. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^

2

7-8, 36 P.3d 533. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an error occurred,
(2) the error was obvious, and (3) the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). To establish that his trial counsel was ineffective,
defendant must show that his counsel's failure to act was both deficient and prejudicial. See
Garrett, 849 P.2d at 579.
4. Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial misconduct when he told the jurors in
closing argument that they "were selected to be on this jury to act as the voice and conscience
of the community" and opined that if the jurors "say to [defendant] that he is not guilty, it is
as true to say that there has been no crime"?
"On appeal from a denial of a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct,
because the trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact on the
proceedings, [the appellate court] will not reverse the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of
discretion." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993). "The test of whether the remarks
made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in the criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by the remarks.'" State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A, together with any other
provision cited in argument:

3

Utah R. Crim. P. 16 - Discovery;
Utah R. Evid. 803 - Hearsay Exceptions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 22,2001, defendant was charged with the murder of Kehndra Isakson, the
attempted murder or aggravated assault of Joe Valdez, the aggravated assault or simple
assault of Shane Alvera, the simple assault of Lindsay Isakson, and obstruction ofjustice (R.
18-22). The murder charges were subject to enhanced penalties based on defendant's use of
a firearm (id.).1
A jury trial was conducted on November 18-20 & 26, 2002 (R. 288-89, 295-98,38689). On November 26, 2002, the jury found defendant guilty of the murder of Kehndra
Isakson, guilty of the aggravated assault of Joe Valdez, guilty of the aggravated assault of
Shane Alvera, guilty of obstruction ofjustice, and not guilty of the assault of Lindsay Isakson
(R. 371-75). The jury also found that defendant used a dangerous weapon in committing the
crimes (R. 371-72). Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of fiveyears-to-life for murder, one-to-fifteen years for second-degree aggravated assault, zero-tofive years for third-degree aggravated assault, and one-to-fifteen years for obstruction of
justice (R. 398-400). The judgment was formally entered on January 16, 2003 (id.).
On January 24, 2003, defendant moved for a new trial on that grounds that one of
defendant's co-defendants confessed to a jail inmate that he, not defendant, shot the victim
(R. 404-08). A hearing was scheduled, but the inmate refused to testify (R. 468-69). On
]

Defendant was also charged with possession or use of a firearm by a restricted
person, but that charge was dismissed following the verdicts in this case (R. 19-20, 22022, 290-94, 467).
4

November 1, 2004, the court denied the new trial motion because no evidence supported it
(R. 468-69). A timely notice of appeal was filed on November 3, 2004 (R. 472).2
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Defendant had nothing against Kehndra Isakson (R507: 35). In fact, he did not even
know her (id.). Nevertheless, he murdered her on September 29, 2001 (R. 371).
The night began normally. Kehndra and her fiance, Joe Valdez, were at a friend's
party in Kearns, Utah (R503: 108-12). About 50 friends were there, including Kehndra's
little sister, Lindsey (R503: 115-16, 163-66). Some of the partygoers were drinking hard
alcohol, but Joe had only one beer and Lindsay had nothing to drink before the trouble began
(R503: 116-17,141-42,166).
Defendant and his friends, Ezekiel House, Gustavo Roman, Isaac Martinez, and •
Rafael (Last Name Unknown) arrived at the party around 10 or 11 p.m. (R504: 309-10;
R505: 528). Joe and Kehndra did not know defendant, but Lindsay recognized him as a^
friend's former boyfriend (R503: 155, 173-74).

2

Defendant does not challenge the denial of his motion for new trial, but includes
the jail inmate's affidavit and a Legal Defender Association's interview in the addenda to
his brief. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.], Addendum A. This Court should not consider
these unsworn and unsubstantiated allegations. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290
(UtahApp. 1998).
3

In his Statement of Facts, defendant ignores appellate standards and fails to folly
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's rulings or set forth the facts in the light
most favorable to the jury verdicts. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, If 60, 28 P.3d
1278. Consequently, as will be discussed infra, this Court should summarily refuse to
consider several of his fact-dependent claims. See id. at % 61.
5

House started the trouble about 30 minutes later. House was playing craps (dice) in
the kitchen with Dennis McGowan and some others (R503: 167-73; R504: 272). McGowan
was winning, but decided to quit to rejoin his girlfriend (R504: 272). House got upset and
McGowan told him that they could settle their argument "outside" (R504: 272-73). House
responded, "F11 blast you right now if you want to trip" (R504:296-97). They began pushing
each other (R503: 176; R504: 231-32, 272-73). McGowan testified, "We were in each
other's face" (R504: 297).
The two were ordered outside (R503: 176; R504: 273). Some girls pushed House
towards the front door in the living room (R504: 297). As a small crowd gathered, House
struck a ceiling lamp askew and hit one of the girls (R503: 177, 202-04; R504: 381-82).
Lindsey tried to intervene, but House pushed her down and continued to hit the other girl
(R503: 178, 204). Someone hit Lindsey on the back of her head (id.). When she turned,
defendant was directly behind her (R503: 178, 209).4
Kehndra yelled for Joe, who was in the basement (R503: 117-18). When he came
upstairs, several partygoers surrounded defendant and two of his friends in the corner of the
living room (R503: 123). Joe approached with the intention of fighting whoever had hit
Lindsey and, he assumed, Kehndra (R503: 122-23, 144-45). Before Joe could swing,
defendant pulled out a .25 caliber semi-automatic handgun from his waistband and fired it
twice into the ceiling of the living room (R503: 124-26,179; R504: 234-35; R505: 501, 504-

4

Because defendant was the closest person to her, Lindsay believed he had hit her,
but admitted that she could not be positive since she did not see him (R503: 209).
Defendant was acquitted of the assault (R. 375).
6

05, 511). Defendant then pointed the gun directly at Joe and Kehndra (R503: 124-28, 200,
206; R504: 232-35). Joe was unarmed and immediately backed away (R503: 128,145,15354, 156-57, 206). He told defendant, "We don't need this" (R503: 128-29).
Only 20 seconds elapsed between when Lindsay was hit on the head and defendant
fired his gun (R503: 179).
Defendant and his friends walked towards the front door as Joe and a few others
followed (R503: 128-29; R504: 236). At the door, Lindsey heard a "black guy" say to
defendant, "Give me the gun" (R503: 196-98). Defendant responded, "no, no" and ran out
the front door with the .25 caliber gun still in his hand (R503: 182, 195-98, 213-214). The
"black guy" who asked for gun "was still in the house" when defendant ran outside (R503:
213-15; R505:516).5
Kehndra, Lindsey, Joe, and Joe's friend, Shane Alvera, stood on the front porch and
watched as defendant walked down the driveway on the east side of the house (R503: 13034, 181; R504: 236-37). Defendant walked only 10-15 feet down the driveway and then
stopped close to the front sidewalk (R503: 134-35,182-83). See Exhibits 6 & 14. He turned

5

Defendant speculated to the jury that the "black guy" was House (R506: 720). No
evidence supports this. Lindsey could not identify the person and there were lots of
"black people" at the party (R503: 197; R505: 575). Moreover, while defendant draws
only one inference from this statement, to wit, that the person asked for the gun to fire it,
there is an equally reasonable inference: the person asked for the gun to prevent defendant
from firing it again. See R503: 196-98, 200, 213-15; R505: 516, 518. In any case,
defendant did not hand over the gun.
7

around and faced the porch (R503: 135). Defendant raised his gun, held it with both hands,
and fired multiple times at the people on the porch (R503: 134-35, 185).6
Only five to ten seconds elapsed between when defendant fired his gun in the living
room and fired it again at the people on the porch (R503: 181).
One bullet hit Kehndra in her chest (R503: 94-96,101-02). Kehndra screamed, "ow,"
and collapsed in Lindsey's arms (R503: 136,181,210). She died minutes later (R503: 136).
Joe felt excruciating pain in his knee and realized he had been shot (R503: 138). Shane
Alvera was shot in the wrist (R504: 237, 242-44).
Joe watched defendant fire his gun at the porch (R503: 134-35,139,147-48). Joe saw
the flash of fire from the first bullet, looked back at Kehndra, who was behind Joe, and then
heard defendant fire three more times in rapid succession (R503: 147-48). Lindsey did not
see the fire flashes, but knew it was defendant who fired because she watched him leave the
house with the gun in his hand, walk to end of the driveway, turn, and aim the gun at the
people on the porch (R503: 182-186, 213-215; R505: 511-13, 519-20). 7
6

Defendant states that "someone" shot at the house. See Br.Aplt. at 9. This fails to
fairly present the trial evidence—especially where defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
7

Defendant fails to view the evidence of his identification in the light most
favorable to the jury verdicts and, instead, improperly argues alleged inconsistencies in
the testimony and claims it was too dark to see. See Br.Aplt. at 7-9, 13-15 n.4 & 17-18.
The record establishes that Joe identified the inside and outside shooter as the same
person (R503: 125-28, 133-35, 139). Joe and defendant were only one or two feet apart
in the living room and only ten or fifteen feet apart outside (id.). Joe positively picked
defendant out of a photo spread (R504: 367-68). Lindsay knew defendant and easily
identified him as the inside shooter (R503: 173-74, 179). Outside, she saw him point the
gun at the victims (R503: 186, 190, 196-98, 213-15). Defendant told Isaac Martinez that
he was the inside shooter and admitted to the police that he had his .25 caliber gun with

8

McGowan also saw defendant fire at the victims. Just after his argument with House,
McGowan heard that "someone" had a gun and decided to leave (R504: 298). He left the
house through the garage, walked into the front yard, and heard shots from inside the house
(R504: 274-75). A few seconds later, he heard at least ten more shots from outside (R504:
279, 282, 291, 298). At trial, he claimed he never saw the shooter (id.). On crossexamination, he admitted that he previously told the police that five seconds after he heard
the shots from inside the house, he saw defendant and his friends run out of the house into
the front yard (R504: 282). Defendant was carrying something small and dark in his hand
(R504: 283). Though McGowan made several contradictory statements to the police, he
ultimately admitted in a police interview that he saw defendant fire multiple times at the
people on the porch, but was afraid that he would be killed if he was labeled a "snitch"
(R504: 299-304, 350-57, 394-405, 409-10).8
Isaac Martinez came to the party with defendant and testified for the defense at trial
(R505:528). Martinez climbed through abasement window into the backyard when he heard
him at the party (R504: 436; R505: 541-42). After the party, defendant still had the gun
until he and House threw it in the river (R504: 313,315-16). Because defendant does not
challenge the sufficiency of this evidence to convict him, it is improper for him to
minimize it.
8

Defendant represents that McGowan 5s identification of defendant is the result of
police coercion and misconduct. See Br,Aplt.. at 10-13. The detective who interviewed
McGowan denied this. He explained that McGowan was afraid that he might be killed if
he identified defendant, but nevertheless admitted that he saw defendant shoot the victims
over the course of several interviews (R504: 300-304, 350-57, 394-405, 407-10). During
trial, McGowan attempted to recant his prior identification of defendant (R504: 280-300).
When it became obvious that his recantation was a lie, the trial court excused the jury,
warned McGowan that he could be charged with perjury, and advised him of his right to
counsel (R504: 301).
9

the "fighting upstairs" (R505: 538). While still in the backyard, he heard two shots; he then
jumped the fence into the front yard and heard more shots coming from the direction of the
garage (R505: 538-40). As he ran away, he saw defendant running from the house, but still
heard a couple shots (R505: 534-35). Martinez said he did not know if defendant was armed,
but then acknowledged that defendant admitted to him that he fired his gun inside the house
(R505: 533, 540-41). According to Martinez, House and Rafael also had guns at the party,
but did not use them (R505: 533, 535, 539). Martinez insisted that he did not know who shot
the victims (R505: 535, 539).9
Steven Butler also left the house when the first shots were fired (R505: 571). He
stopped in the front yard on the west side of the house, which on the other side of the house
from the driveway on the east (R505: 571). See Exhibit 53. As people streamed from the
house, he heard more shots fired outside (R505: 571-72). Butler kneeled down on the lawn
about 20-25 feet northwest from the front door and tried to find his friend among those
fleeing the house (R505: 573-74). As he moved a bit closer to the house, he saw the flash
ofgun fire in his peripheral vision, about 10-15 feet to his left (R505: 573-575, 583-89). See
Exhibit 53. The shooter was black with poofy hair and stood at a different location in the
yard than where Joe and Lindsey placed defendant (R503: 254-55; R505: 576-583).
Compare Exhibits 6, 14, & 53. Butler testified that shots were coming "from all around" for

9

Defendant suggests that his admission to Martinez is hearsay and, therefore, less
credible. See Br.Aplt. at 20. By definition, a party's admission is not hearsay. See Utah
R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (Add. A).
10

30-45 seconds (R505: 588-90). Butler thought the shots sounded like they were from
different caliber guns.
When the shooting stopped, defendant, House, Raphael, and their friends fled the
scene (R504: 309-10). They drove to Raphael's house in Chesterfield near the Jordan River
(R504: 11). Defendant still had his gun with him (R504: 313, 315-16). Defendant gave the
gun to House, who wiped off any fingerprints and placed the gun in a bag with at least one
other gun (R504: 314-17,380). The group then walked to the river and House threw the bag
of guns into the water (id.).
Two weeks later, one of the group—Gustavo Roman—told the police about the guns
and took them to the spot where House had thrown the bag into the river (R504: 317, 37575). A nine-millimeter gun and a .25 caliber magazine were recovered, but the police did not
find defendant's .25 caliber semi-automatic gun (R504: 376-77, 388-89).10
When the police inspected the murder scene, they found numerous nine-millimeter
spent casings near the location where Butler saw the second shooter and also found ninemillimeter bullets in the eaves of the home (R505: 608-19).u
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Defendant implies that the police just happened to find these items. See Br.Aplt.
at 19. He omits that Roman cooperated with the police and brought them to the exact
location where the guns were thrown into the river (R504: 317).
ll

Defendant asserts that the nine millimeter casings were "not located anywhere
near where the eyewitnesses testified the fatal shooter was standing/running." See
Br.Aplt. at 18. This is true, but defendant ignores the fair inference of this testimony:
defendant shot the victims with a .25 caliber gun; a second shooter shot at the house with
a nine-millimeter gun.
11

The police located one fired .25 caliber shell casing in the living room carpet and a
bullet hole in the living room ceiling (R504: 328-332, 340-41). They discovered two spent
.25 caliber shell casings outside, near the driveway, in the location where Joe and Lindsey
placed defendant (R504: 333-37). The spent .25 casing found in the living room and the two
spent .25 casings found outside were fired from the same gun (R504: 423-25).
A .25 caliber bullet was removed from Kehndra's chest (R504: 348-49). A .25 caliber
bullet was removed from Shane Alvera's wrist (R504: 348-49, 378-79). The bullet which
struck Joe could not be removed without further damaging his knee (R503:139). The bullets
removed from Kehndra and Shane were fired from the same .25 caliber gun (R504: 425-26).
But without the gun itself, the state firearms expert could not positively match the spent
casings found at the scene with the bullets removed from the victims, other than to identify
them as all being the same caliber (R504: 426). Though the gun was never recovered,
defendant admitted that he brought a .25 caliber semi-automatic gun to the party (R504:436).
Additional facts relevant to individual points will be discussed in the argument portion
of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions. Nevertheless, he claims that his otherwise valid convictions should be vacated
because the trial court, his trial counsel, and the prosecutor committed prejudicial errors.
This Court need not consider the merits of several of defendant's arguments because he fails
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to marshal the evidence upon which the arguments are necessarily based. Even if the merits
are considered, no error occurred.
Exclusion of Marco Etsitty. Defendant does not dispute that a trial court may
sanction a party's noncompliance with a discovery order by excluding a witness. Defendant
claims only that here, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding defense witness Marco
Etsitty. Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
ruling, this Court should summarily reject defendant's claim of error. Even if the merits are
considered, the record supports the trial court's actions.
Below, defense counsel conceded that she failed to disclose multiple defense
witnesses prior to trial, but claimed her noncompliance with the pretrial discovery order was
excusable because she had not decided to call the witnesses until mid-trial. The trial court
rejected this explanation as it related to Marco Etsitty because the defense subpoenaed him
weeks before trial. The court found that defense counsel deliberately chose not to disclose
Etsitty pretrial and sanctioned the noncompliance by barring Etsitty' s testimony. At the same
time, the court accepted defense counsel's explanations regarding the delayed disclosure of
other witnesses and did not bar their testimony. Given the circumstances of this case, the
trial court acted within its discretion.
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in choosing not
to disclose that Etsitty would be a defense witness. Defendant fails to carry his burden of
establishing a Sixth Amendment violation.
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When the trial court sanctioned defense counsel, it subjectively judged only the
credibility of counsel's explanations. But to establish that counsel was ineffective, defendant
must affirmatively establish both that the conduct of his counsel was objectively
unreasonable and that but for his counsel's conduct, the outcome of his trial would have been
different. Here, defendant's ineffectiveness claim may be easily rejected for lack of
prejudice—Etsitty's testimony was cumulative of other undisputed testimony and, therefore,
whether permitted or not, the outcome of the trial would be the same. Consequently, this
Court need not resolve whether his counsel's conduct was also deficient.
Exclusion of Hearsay. The trial court ruled that defense witness Isaac Martinez
could not testify to what a bystander told him he observed. Though the bystander spoke in
an excited tone when he spoke to Martinez, the bystander's out-of-court description of what
he observed during of the shooting did not constitute an excited utterance pursuant to rule
803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled the statement
inadmissible. This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim, however, because
he failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling.
Closing Argument - Alleged Misstatement of Evidence. During closing argument,
the prosecutor summarized Lindsey Isakson's testimony. The prosecutor said that when
defendant exited the front door, a "black man" ask him for his gun, defendant refused, and
defendant went in a "completely opposite direction" from the "black man." Defendant raised
no objection to the prosecutor's statement.
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For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the prosecutor misrepresented
Lindsey's testimony. Consequently, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the statement and the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte correcting it. Both
claims fail, however, because no error occurred. The prosecutor fairly represented Lindsey's
testimony and properly argued its fair inferences.
Closing Argument—Alleged Appeal to Emotion.

At the conclusion of the

prosecutor's closing argument, defendant objected to the prosecutor reminding the jury that
they "were selected to be on this jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community."
The trial court initially ruled the objection untimely, but then properly overruled the
objection because the prosecutor simply restated what the court itself told the jury. The
court's conclusion is consistent with the majority view.
Defendant also objected when the prosecutor opined that "if you [the jury] say to
[defendant] that he is not guilty, it is as true to say that there has been no crime." The
prosecutor's statement was made in response to defendant's argument that a not guilty
verdict could mean different things. Because defendant fails to marshal the facts surrounding
the statement, this Court may summarily reject his claim of error. If the merits are
considered, the trial court correctly viewed the prosecutor's statement as legitimate
responsive argument. The court also correctly noted that no prejudice resulted from the
statement in that it was clearly rhetorical and did not suggest that the jury should disregard
the evidence.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I12
THE TRIAL COURT PERMISSIBLY BARRED ETSITTY FROM
TESTIFYING BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE PRETRIAL DISCOVERY; ALTERNATIVELY,
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN CHOOSING NOT TO DESIGNATE ETSITTY AS A
WITNESS PRIOR TO TRIAL
The trial court ordered the parties to exchange witness lists at least ten days prior to
trial (R. 121, 202-04). The defense submitted a list of some 15 trial witnesses (R.218-19).
After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief, the defense informed the court that it would
be calling only two of its designated witnesses and planned on calling multiple persons who
were not formally designated as trial witnesses by either party. (R504: 442-44, 447). The
prosecutor objected (R505: 459). After extensive discussions, the trial court rejected
counsel's explanation in regards to one proposed witness, Marco Etsitty, and refused to allow
him to testify (R505: 468, 475-77). The court allowed defendant to call the other proposed
witnesses (id.). See Addendum B (Argument & Ruling Excluding Marco Etsitty).
Defendant now claims the court erred in finding that his counsel chose not to comply
with the discovery order and abused its discretion in excluding Etsitty. See Br.Aplt. at 27-3 5.
The Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim because he has not marshaled the
evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,fflf60-61,
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The State responses to defendant's Point I and 11(A).
16

28 P.3d 1278. If the merits are considered, the record supports the trial court's factual
findings and ruling.
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in choosing not
to disclose Etsitty as a witness prior to trial. See Br.Aplt. at 35-38. Defendant ignores,
however, the high burden he bears in alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. Not only must he
establish that his counsel's strategic choice was deficient, he must also show that absent the
choice, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT
App 222, f 30, 112 P.3d 1252. Because defendant fails to establish either prong, his
argument necessarily fails. See id.
A. The Merits of Defendant's Claim Should Not Be Considered Because
Defendant Fails to Marshal the Facts in Support of the Trial Court's
Findings and Ruling.
Before a defendant may attack a trial court's ruling, he must marshal the evidence
which supports it. See ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Rearguing facts based on "selective excerpts
of the record" does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Id. "Instead, [a defendant] must
first marshal all the evidence in support of the [challenged] finding and then demonstrate that
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below." Id. Accord Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^f 60. Moreover,
when a factual finding is predicated on an assessment of credibility, a trial court must be
allowed to draw "its own conclusions." See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,314 (Utah
1998).
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Here, defendant fails to marshal the facts which support the finding that his counsel
chose not to timely disclose that Etsitty would be a defense witness. Defendant also does not
marshal the facts which support the trial court's decision to impose a sanction.
Consequently, this Court may, summarily refuse to consider defendant's claim of error. See
Widdison, 2001 UT 60,fflf60-61.
A review of the discovery procedure reveals defendant's failure to marshal.
Defendant does not acknowledge that the trial court entered a formal order of
discovery months before trial. See Br.Aplt. at 21 -24 & 30-34. The marshaled facts establish
that defendant requested and received extensive pretrial discovery from the prosecution (R.
11-12, R. 23, 25-30, 32, 38-40, 41, 43, 45, 49-50, 52-53, 55-56, 58, 60, 62, 64). The
discovery included the names of over 100 potential witnesses, along with reports, transcripts,
and/or audiotapes of police interviews of at least 60 of those individuals, including Marco
Etsitty (id.).
More than six months before trial, the prosecution requested the names of defendant's
trial witnesses and any reports of their anticipated testimony (R. 99-100,102-07). Defendant
did not object. On April 17, 2002, the trial court ordered defendant to timely provide the
prosecutor with the names of the defense trial witnesses and reminded defense counsel of her
ethical duty to update any witness information (R. 121).
The marshaled facts establish that two months after the court initially ordered
reciprocal discovery of trial witnesses, defendant filed a reply opposing it (R. 140-55).
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Defense counsel insisted even if the court ordered it, a defense trial witness list could not be
provided prior to trial:
In regard to the State's request, a list of witnesses the defense intends to call
at trial and the addresses, phone numbers, and dates of birth of those witnesses,
the defendant states that he will not decide who to call as witnesses until he
has first heard the testimony of the state's witnesses. This is much the same
decision-making process the prosecutor goes through in deciding what
witnesses to call in rebuttal to the defense case. That decision cannot be made
until after the opposing party's witnesses have testified. The defendant,
therefore, cannot comply with the state's request, even if so ordered by the
court, until the close of the state's case-in-chief.
(R. 142). The prosecutor filed a second memorandum in support of its prior discovery
request (R. 188-93). On August 2, 2002, the trial court entered a second order directing
defendant to provide a list of the defense trial witnesses and defense trial exhibits (R. 20204). Defendant acknowledges none of these facts. See Br.Aplt. at 21-24 & 30-34.
On September 24, 2002, the prosecutor provided defendant with a list of its trial
witnesses and exhibits (R. 207-11). On September 27,2002, defendant provided a list of 15
defense witnesses, reserving the right to call additional witnesses (R. 218-19). Marco Etsitty
was not listed as a trial witness by either party.
The marshaled facts establish that on October 7, 2002, the trial court again ordered
the parties to exchange final trial witness lists before November 7,2002, which was less than
ten days before the scheduled trial (R. 235-36, 239-40).
On October 22 or 25,2002, defendant interviewed Marco Etsitty and served him with
a subpoena to appear for trial on November 18th (R. 255; R505: 467). Defense counsel did
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not amend her previously filed witness list to include Etsitty or otherwise disclose that the
defense intended to call Etsitty as a trial witness.
The week before trial, the prosecutor asked defense counsel to provide an updated list
of witnesses after defense counsel casually mentioned that she might call witnesses who were
not on her witness list (R505: 468). Defendant did not update her witness list or otherwise
disclose the identity of the undesignated witnesses prior to trial. Defendant fails to marshal
these facts. See Br.Aplt. at 21-24 & 30-34.
At trial, in its case-in-chief, the prosecution presented evidence implicating only
defendant; no evidence was introduced of a second shooter, who fired at the house with a
different caliber gun, but did not hit anyone. See Statement of Facts, supra. After the
prosecution rested, defense counsel for the first time informed the court that she intended to
call only two of the 15 witnesses on her witness list and in addition would call numerous
undesignated witnesses (R505: 442-53). The prosecutor specifically objected to the defense
calling Marco Etsitty, Adrien Lewis, Aaron Zippro, and Stephen Butler, none of whom had
been listed as trial witnesses (R. 307-17; R505: 459-60).
After lengthy discussions over two days, the trial court found that defense counsel had
intentionally chosen not to designate Etisitty as a witness, even though counsel had
interviewed and subpoenaed Etsitty weeks before trial (R505: 468, 471, 476-77, 480). See
Addendum B (Argument and Ruling Excluding Etsitty). The court concluded that exclusion
of Etisitty 5s testimony was an appropriate sanction (id.).
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In reaching this decision, the court considered several facts, none of which are
marshaled by defendant. See Br.Aplt. at 23-24. The court noted that defendant's original
witness list appeared to have little meaning in that the defense intended to call only two of
the 15 listed witnesses (R505: 447-48). The court noted that over 150 potential witnesses
were involved in the case, which required counsel to responsibly pare down its potential trial
witnesses (R505: 471-72). For the same reason, the mere fact that the police may have
interviewed Etsitty—along with the other potential 150 witnesses—a year before trial, did
not provide the prosecution with reasonable notice that the defense would call him as a trial
witness (R505: 471-73).
Defendant also does not marshal the court's credibility findings. Defendant claims
that the only reason the court gave for finding that his counsel intentionally omitted Etsitty,
was that defense counsel provided such "excellent representation." See Br.Aplt. at 30.
Defendant states that the "trial court did not make any finding that the defense lied about the
matter or wilfully violated the requirement to disclose witnesses, or that they willfully
omitted to disclose in an effort to obtain some tactical advantage." See Br.Aplt. at 30. The
marshaled facts are otherwise.
The trial court clearly and repeatedly stated that defense counsel's non-disclosure
reflected on the integrity of the court and called into question the professional and ethical
conduct of counsel:
COURT: But I find it extremely unprofessional that tapes are provided are not
listened to by both sides or reviewed or viewed by both sides. That witness
lists are not pared down. And that a witness list that's accurate is not provided
to the other side. What it amounts to is it sounds like preparation for the trial
21

was done the weekend before trial and that by the time of the pretrial back in
early November, none of these decisions had been made. And now you're
asking me to allow the witnesses to testify.
(R504: 448). The court continued to probe defense counsel:
COURT: When did you make the decision to call the witnesses that you just
told me about?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Some of them we've made just this week, Judge. In
fact some of them were subpoenaed this week.
COURT: When did you make the decision to call these witnesses?
COUNSEL: I'll have to check the subpoenas, Judge.
COURT: Some of them you knew about before trial and did not disclose to the
other side; is that correct?
COUNSEL: Some of them we anticipated possibly calling today or tomorrow
when we put on our case, but COURT: I'm not getting an answer. . .
(R504: 449). The court summarized its initial feelings and continued to question counsel:
COURT: I'm aware that there are about a hundred different witnesses that
could have been called. I still don't understand why you did not notify the
State of who you intended to call out of the long list. And I think it's - I'll
probably allow the witnesses to testify because great latitude is given to
defendants in criminal cases, but I'll be honest with you, this is unprofessional
in my opinion. And I have real problems with a nondisclosure of witnesses.
And I have hard time understanding why you did not advise the State of
changes in your plans. And I can't believe that you made all the changes
today. When did you send out your subpoenas for these witnesses?
COUNSEL: They were sent out at different times, Judge, and I can't answer
at this time.
COURT: I'm not getting an answer I guess. . . . Do you have copies of what
you sent out?
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COUNSEL: I'm sure we do. I don't have them with me here today.
COURT: Well, let me suggest you better get them because I want to know at
what point you made the decision and whether or not there was an opportunity
to tell the State. . . . [A] criminal trial is not supposed to be a game of hide the
ball.
(R504: 450-51). See Add. B.
The court continued to question counsel the next morning after the prosecutor
discovered that Etsitty had been subpoenaed by the defense weeks before trial (R505: 459475). Ultimately, the court barred Etsitty from testifying:
COURT: . . . I'm going to exclude the witness's testimony. As I said
yesterday, I'm not only concerned about the defendant getting a fair trial, I'm
also concerned about what is appropriate conduct by counsel. And in this case
I'm not going to condone the fact that a witness was subpoenaed on October
25th and not - the State was not notified of that until the middle of trial. I have
some grave concerns about it. And it appears that the case cited by the
prosecution, Taylor versus Illinois, is directly on point. Mr. Etsitty will not
be testifying.
(R505: 468). The court further clarified that the basis of its decision was "the fact that the
subpoena went out on Mr. Etsitty on October 25th, which indicates clearly that the defense
knew they would be calling this witness" (R505: 471).
The discussion continued (R505: 471-74). The court was still not satisfied with
counsel's explanations: "I'd like to hear why you haven't disclosed these names. I've never
gotten an adequate explanation to that. Give me a good reason" (R505: 474). Counsel
suggested that the subpoena meant little because the defense had subpoenaed several
witnesses who they now had decided not to call (id.).
representation:
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The court questioned this

COURT: Let me see if I understand what you're saying because it's not
making a great deal of sense to me. Are you saying that you didn't decide who
to call until the middle of trial? . . .
COUNSEL: I'm saying some of the witnesses we did not decide to call until
the State had put on their case.
COURT: Okay. And that certainly could not be true of Mr. Etsitty.
(R505: 474-75). After further discussion, the court entered its ruling, from which defendant
cites only parsed phrases:
COURT: . . . I am relying on the case [Taylor] cited. I am also relying on
basic principles of equity and the fact that this is not a run-of-the-mill trial.
. . . my observation is that the defense has been extremely well-prepared, they
have had their questioning and their total preparation very well handled,
indicated that they have known all along how they wanted to try this case.
This is not a case where the defense has not made a good showing in terms of
representation of their client. On the contrary, we've had a display from the
defense of excellent representation. And consequently, I cannot find that this
was an error or just an omission on the part of the defense. There's very
careful preparation that's occurred here, show by the excellent performance of
counsel. That it appears that it was a choice, especially since Mr. Etsitty, as
indicated, was subpoenaed as long ago as October 25th. And I'm assuming that
he was talked to by the defense on or about that time or prior to that time since
certainly one would not call a witness one has not talked to.
Again, I'm leaving open the question of whether Mr. Zippro and Mr.
Butler can testify if they show up and the State has an opportunity to take to
them an hour before they testify, they may be allowed to go forward.
(R505:477). See Add. B.
In sum, because defendant fails to properly marshal the supporting facts, his claim of
error should be summarily rejected. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^j 60-61. If the merits are
considered, the record supports that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion In Barring Etsitty From
Testifying.
Defendant claims that the trial court had no basis to find that his counsel wilfully
failed to comply with the discovery order and that without a wilful violation, the court abused
its discretion in imposing witness exclusion as a sanction. See Br.Aplt. at 30-32. The claim
is without factual or legal support.
The trial court cited Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) as "directly on point" and
the basis of its decision to sanction counsel (R505: 468 & 476-77). The court was correct.
In Taylor, the prosecutor filed a motion seeking pretrial disclosure of defense
witnesses. 484 U.S. at 403. Taylor's defense counsel disclosed some witnesses, but on the
first day of trial, amended his list to include other witnesses. Id. On the second day of trial,
after the prosecutor's main witnesses had finished testifying, Taylor's counsel again
attempted to amend the witness list by including two witnesses, whose materiality he claimed
he had just discovered. Id. at 403-04. But upon further inquiry, the credibility of counsel's
representation was called into question and ultimately, the trial court determined that counsel
had interviewed one of the witnesses prior to trial, but had intentionally chosen not to
designate as a witness until mid-trial. Id. at 404-05. The trial court sanctioned counsel by
barring the witness from testifying. Id. at 405.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that exclusion of a criminal defense
witness "is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment" and was justified in Taylor's case. Id. at 402.
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The adversary process could not function without adherence to rules of
procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to
provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to
contradict or explain the opponent's case. The trial process would be in
shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content
of his witnesses' testimony. . .. The defendant's right to compulsory process
is itself designed to vindicate the principle that the "ends of justice would be
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the evidence." [Citation omitted.] Rules that provide for
pretrial discovery of an opponent's witnesses serve the same high purpose.
Discovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be
predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated
testimony. The "State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour
defense is merely one component of the broader public interest in a full and
truthful disclosure of critical facts.
Id. at 411-12. The Court held that a trial judge could demand an explanation of defense
counsel for counsel's noncompliance with a pretrial discovery order and "[i]If that
explanation reveals that the omission was wilful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical
advantage . . . it would be entirely consistent [with constitutional principles] to exclude the
witness' testimony." Id. at 415.
One of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk that
fabricated testimony will be believed. Defendants who are willing to fabricate
a defense may also be willing to fabricate excuses for failing to comply with
a discovery requirement
A dishonest client can mislead an honest attorney,
and there are occasions when an attorney assumes that the duty of loyalty to
the client outweighs elementary obligations to the court.
Id. at 413-14.
In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that defense counsel's actions fell
squarely within Taylor,

Nevertheless, defendant attempts to distinguish Taylor on the

ground that the prosecutor in Taylor had no prior knowledge of the content of the challenged
witnesses' anticipated testimony. See Br.Aplt. at 33. This is a distinction without meaning
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here. As the trial court properly recognized, the mere fact that Etsitty was previously
interviewed by the police lost significance when the interview was only one of i 51 potential
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Br.Aplt. at 22 n.8, Etsitty's claim of being threatening was not included in his police
interview, but constituted new information (R505: 486).
Defendant also argues that 1 oj 'lot oiil> pen n lits the sa notion of exclusion if a pai ty
wilfully fails to comply with a discovery order, which defendant claims the trial court did not
find here. See Br.Aplt. at 29-30. Again, the claim is without merit.
r

i ne ucicrminai-oii

. a\ ivi Li.at counsel acie,;

r.i :a..iiiL: to comply w an

the discovery order involves nearly identical, but less egregious, facts than those in this case:
Taylor's counsel interviewed the challenged witness days only a week before trial; here,
defendant's counsel interviewed and subpoenaed Etsitty weeks beloiv trial. Set
c lisci issi(>n. \;i.1 : •

MV<

- r . "•• -]i'- ''-• •*-*

•! \ U . . i n d a r 1

• M*U-•!.

JULIUUI

:

finding that "depends primarily on whether the district court accepts or rejects counsel's
explanation as to why he could not provide notice" of his witnesses. United States v. Levy-

Defendant also argues that wilfulness cannot be found where he did not "hide" Etsitty,
but simply failed to announce his defense until after the prosecution had rested. See Br.Aplt.
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of counsel's actions:

27

uH : I i.

: | C C l U l Mii> U i a i L t L U ' I I / a l n HI

1

Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of
constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the
nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict
on the State's case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand
himself.
484 U.S. at 416 n.21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Michigan v.
Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991) (recognizing that "a criminal trial is not ca poker game in
which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their hands until played'") (citation
omitted).
Defendant argues that exclusion is too severe a sanction here because Etsitty's
testimony was determinative of the outcome of his trial. SeeBr.Aplt. at 33-35. Based on the
other record evidence, this is not true. Etsitty's proffered testimony was cumulative of
Butler's actual testimony that a black man standing in the front yard shot at the house.
Compare R505: 465-66 & 478-80, with R505: 570-92. This fact was not in dispute nor was
it determinative of defendant's guilt—especially when Etsitty did not know where defendant
was at the time of the shooting. See also Statement of Facts, supra.
Finally, defendant argues that exclusion is too harsh a sanction where no prejudice
would have resulted if Etsitty had been allowed to testify. SeeBr.Aplt. at 33-35. This ignores
the prosecutor's claim of prejudice below (R505: 472-73). Moreover, m Taylor and other
cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that exclusion of a witness is an appropriate
sanction "' regardless of whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided by a
lesser penalty," because noncompliance with a court order impacts the very integrity of the
court itself. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152 (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417).
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violated his right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See Br.Aplt. at 37-38.
Without analysis, defendant summarily assumes that because the trial court subjectively
rejected u^ ^rcair; l i v ,
reaM'ii *h!e an '

,icrense counsel's explanations, counsel's actions cannot be
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to an ineffectiveness claim raised under to the Sixth Amendment. 13
When the lii.r court sanctioned counsel, the court did not consider what other

deference or presumption of correctness. The court simply detemiined that counsel had not
complied with the court's discovery order, judged the credibility of counsel's explanations
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ly determined that counsel's explanations

were credible as to some witnesses, but not credible in connection with Etsitty.

See

discussion, supra. Entirely different analytical standards apply in to a Sixth Amendment
claim.

.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "reasonably

effective" counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Sixth
Amendment docs aep,aa .
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Moreover, defendant cites State v. Smith, 2003 U I App 52, 65 P.3d 648, as
controlling authority, see Br.Aplt. at 36-37, but the ineffectiveness holding in that case
was reversed on certiorari. See State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^ 21, 122 P.3d 615.
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mat

counsel make objectively reasonable choices" based "on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477'-79
(2000). Indeed, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
In sum, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that defendant's counsel will be of
high quality, it guarantees that defendant's trial will be fair:
[The United States Supreme Court has] consistently declined to impose
mechanical rules on counsel—even when those rules might lead to better
representation—not simply out of deference to strategic choices, but because
"the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is
not to improve the quality of legal representation, . . . but rather simply to
ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial."
Roe, 528 U.S. at 481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Consequently, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, defendant must first
demonstrate that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Accord State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 38, 122
P.3d 543. The issue is not whether trial counsel should or could have done something more.
It is whether defendant has proven that no reasonable attorney would have done what his trial
counsel did. See Roe, 528 U.S. at 478-79. In particular, defendant must establish facts that
"overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Accord Roe, 528 U.S. at 477 & 482; Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 38.
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This Court need not resolve the deficiency issue, however, because defendant fails to
establish prejudice, the second requirement of constitutional metlcctiveness. Sec
2005 [ I I \ p p 222, 1] 30 (i • ;cogni/in$:
defendant cannot establish prejudice).

'

• vi< 'U"i.-\ P . ng nr *.;

hooyman,

>t - • ..Mre^cd, if

Here, defendant claims only that his counsel

committed "attorney error"; consequently, he must establish that actual prejudice resulted
fron l tl le alleged en oi

S ee Roe, 528 1 1.S. at 482-483 (citing i ' nited, S tates i:'" C / < : nic %6

U.S. 648, 659 & n.26 (1984)). In other words, defendant is required to show that but for his
counsel's failure to list Etsitty as a witness, Etsitty would have testified such that the outcome
ofdeiciiuan; • .- ,

...

,'I'C.M :;!>u.::l. L>ueik;aiiL

- • •. i .

.:....

Below, defense counsel admitted that the defense had subpoenaed many witnesses
whom the defense had decided not to call (R505: 474). Counsel admitted that even though
t:ic vk i.nse was to i-egin ;N case in minutes, it was still 'juggling witnesses and trying to
devidr ^ ho w r"iv <ioiiv i<.

:

"a s witnesses (R^Ov 4~"M ! t \\\ .ind:i\ oil . i "nded^n-^-d

witnesses had been subpoenaed for the morning, but counsel stated that only Zippro and
Butler had shown up so f ai . KM)?: 4. > (>}. Zippro was reluctant to testify and, ultimately,

sum, fii this record, it is -mclcar if IZlsittx would ha\e (a; shown up, and (b) lestified.
Moreover, it Lisitu nad testified, his testimony was cumulative oi Butici s. See
i iiscus. sion, supra at 28. In i idition Etsitt;; - 's testimoi \y • ii i i lot exel i ide defendant as the
murderer. See id. Consequently, inclusion of the testimony would have changed the
outcome of the trial.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT ISAAC
MARTINEZ COULD NOT TESTIFY TO WHAT A BYSTANDER
TOLD HIM ABOUT THE SHOOTING
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that a bystander's out-of-court
statement to Isaac Martinez was inadmissible hearsay. See Br.Aplt. at 40-43. Defendant
argues that because the bystander discussed the shooting, the statement constituted an excited
utterance under rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, and was admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule. See id. This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim because
he fails to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. See Widdison,
2001 UT 60, Yi 60-61. Even if the merits are considered, the ruling is correct.
A. The Merits of Defendant's Claim Should Not Be Considered Because
Defendant Has Failed to Marshal the Facts Supporting the Trial Court's
Decision.
In determining whether an out-of-court statement constitutes an excited utterance, a
court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement, including the event observed, the time between the event and the statement, the
age and capacity of the person making the statement, and the nature of the statement itself.
See discussion, infra. Here, the trial court considered these and other facts in finding the
bystander's statement inadmissible (R505: 553-54). See Addendum C (Examination and
Ruling Excluding Hearsay).
To challenge this ruling on appeal, defendant is required to marshal the underlying
facts and establish why those facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
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court's ruling, are legally insufficient to support the court's detemiination. See ProMax
Development Corp , (;~io \
renin;* ment. \\v< (

'^

\ ui _:o. Because defendant has failed to meet the marshaling
'niiT,'-''' , ; i ^ -...hi
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A discussion of the facts establishes defendant's marshaling failures.
Isaac Martinez can le ' ith defei idant t :»the par (:> and testified on his behalf at ti ial.
See Statement of Facts, supra. During his testimony, defense counsel asked if Martinez
received a telephone call from his cousin, James Storm (R505: 543-44). Martinez said that
l : L ' ! c u \ e u - . -;L- .. ne „ :: ,:

• .j>auei MMI.. . .:•_!.:,, pai i\, but admitted

on cross-examination that he told the police that he did not :r :ik to Storm until the day after
the shooting (R505: 546, 549).

Defendant only minimally acknowledges this time

discrepancy and wholly ignores its impact on the trial court s ruling. S ee Br.Aplt. at 20 n. 7
&43.
Martinez had only briefly seen Storm at the party, did not know where Storm was at
the time of the shootings, in ^ lie know where Storm was at the time of the telephone call, and
did not know \ < - hat Storm 1 \i .d done alter the shooting bi it before the • : all (R 5051 549-50).
Defendant ignores these facts. See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 & 40-43. Martinez only knew that
when Storm called him, Storm, was allegedly "still walking away from the party and needed
someone to pick him i ip"(R 505: 553). Defendant states tl lis fact,bi ltd : ssi lot acknowledge
its impact on the court's ruling. See Br.Aplt. at 21 & 40-43.
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Martinez described Storm as excited and yelling during the call (R505: 546-51).
Martinez said Storm was "just stuttering, because he told me he saw something" (R505: 545).
Defense counsel repeated, "He was stuttering?" (id.). Martinez responded: "Like he was I
- I — I — I — I — I — I just saw Zeke [House] and Raf [Rafael] shoot Kehndra" (id.). The
prosecutor objected to the hearsay statement and the court admonished the jury to disregard
it (id.).
Under further questioning by defense counsel, Martinez related that Storm was
"blurting out" some statements during the call, but also acknowledged that Storm was
responding to questions from Martinez (R505: 548). Defendant does not marshal this fact.
See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 & 40-43.
Defense counsel asked Martinez: "What did he tell you had excited him?" (id.). The
prosecutor again objected that any response was inadmissible hearsay (id.). In a sidebar
conference, defense counsel argued that Storm's out-of-court statement to Martinez was an
excited utterance and, therefore, admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule (R505: 553).
Defense counsel proffered that Storm told Martinez that he was in the front yard when the
shooting occurred and saw House and Rafael "shooting guns towards the house" (R505: 55354). Counsel's proffer of the out-of-court statement (the two shot towards the house) was
different than Martinez's stricken testimony (the two shot Kehndra). See Br.Aplt. at 20-21
& 40-43. Consequently, the substance of the claimed excited utterance is not clear on this
record. Defendant does not acknowledge this fact.
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The trial court found that neither counsel's proffer nor Martinez's testimony
established uiai j v ^ m s statement was an excited utterance:
With reference to the alleged spontaneous utterance, despite the fact that
[defense] counsel used exclusively leading questions to try to elicit from
[Martinez] that there was a spontaneous component to the statement he heard
from another individual, that did not come out. The best we heard was that
someone may have been startled and there is a discrepancy as to what the
timing of the statement was, whether it was some 9 to 12 minutes after the
episode or whether it was the next day. . . . [E]ven though [Martinez] was led, he indicated
that what [Storm] had told him was in response to questions from him. That it was not
spontaneous comments, and therefore that is one of the many things the Court has
considered. Incidentally, [Martinez] blurted out the answer in any event. And despite the
fact that the Court has asked the jury to disregard that, as we all know, once something is said
it's very hard for people to forget it's [sic] been said. So frankly, the defense managed to get
in the statement in any event.
(R505: 554-55). Defendant does not set forth the court's ruling in his brief nor otherwise
acknowledge its factual basis. See Br.Aplt. at 20-21 & 40-43.
because deuncain . . io auequaicr, mar^nai me iac;s in suppoa oi me irkii court s
ruling, this Court should summarily reject defendant's claim of error. I ven • \ -u. - rr -Tii\. \ re
considered, the trial court's ruling is correct.
B. The Trial Court Properly Ruled ti tati I i at tinez C < mid t V <rt1 i *stify to Whata Bystander Told Him.
Defendant does not dispute that Storm's out-of-court statement to Martinez is hearsay.
See Br.Aplt. at 40-43. He argues only that the statement qualifies for admission as an

Rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, recognizes the admissibility of "statement(s)
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition.
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See Add. . \

. ,c theory behind the "excited

utterance" exception is that a state of excitement induced by the event "temporarily stills the
capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." West Valley
City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, f 12, 5 P.3d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The exception is limited only to "truly spontaneous outbursts . . . [and] not the
ongoing discourse of an excited individual." Id. at f 14 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). For the individual's excited emotional reaction may be simply "the result
of retelling the incident, rather than a result of remaining continuously under the original
stress. Emotionalism in recounting a distressing event hours, days, or even years later is not
uncommon, but it does not make the recounting an excited utterance." Id. at \ 22 n.8.
A three-prong test applies in determining if an out-of-court statement constitutes an
excited utterance:
Hearsay statements fall withing the excited utterance exception when "(1) a
startling event or condition occurred, (2) the statement was made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition,
and (3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition."
Id. at H 15 (quoting State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1989)).
Here, prongs one and three are not at issue. To meet the requirements of the second
prong, defendant bears the burden to establish that Storm " 'remained' under the original, and
unsubsided stress of the startling event when making the statements." See Hutto, 2000 UT
App 188, ^ 15 & 20. Relevant factors to consider include the nature of the event, the
emotional effect of the event on the Storm, Storm's age (adult as opposed to child), the lapse
of time between the event and the statement, whether Storm was familiar with or aware of
his surroundings when he made the statement, and whether the statement was spontaneous
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or made in response to questioning. See id. at ^f 16 (citing State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240
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The trial court correctly found that even if Storm spoke excitedly, defendant failed to
establish that Storm had ;:: mained continuously under the original stress" at the time he
spoke with Martinez ( l o o .
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shooting occurred. Presumptively, Storm's reaction to the shooting was no different than the
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focused on Storm's need for a ride. Martinez asked Storm why he was so excited (a strange
question if indeed Martinez fled the same shooting only minutes before). Only then did
Storm discuss w 1 lathe allegedly saw I he tola lity of these facts doi lot si ipport a finding that
the Storm's statement wras wholly spontaneous or made without reasoned reflection. See
Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, ^ 14 <fc 1 7 (recognizing that an "ongoing discourse of an excited
i.Ki:',. :aa; ;k ^ :- . a\\K ...

• an
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uiicrancc uine^.- .nc proponent .»: inc statement

establishes that the declarant remained under the stress of the event to a degree which would
preclude fabrication).
r

i nc conn ai;<-) pivj
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and the event and found the evidence conflicting. Martinez testified that Storm called him
about 12 minutes after the shootings, but admitted that he told the police that he only spoke
to Storm tlic clay alicr UK -.ilooting,

il the statement was made the next day, this fact

substantially negates its spontaneity. See Cude, 784 P.2d at 1200-01 (recognizing that even
five to ten minutes may be sufficient to regain reasoned reflection after an event). But even
if the statement was made 12 minutes after the shooting, Storm's actions and reactions during
those 12 minutes must be considered. See id. Defendant presented no evidence to
establishing Storm's actions during the interval or Storm's subjective character. SeeHutto,
2000 UT App 188, f 24 (recognizing that evidence is necessary to show the declarant's
emotional state during the intervening time between an event and the statement). To the
extent Storm's actions may be gleaned from the record, they do not support a finding that he
acted without reasoned reflection. After the shooting, Storm decided that it would be in his
best interest to leave the scene. As he walked away, he remembered that his cousin Martinez
was at the party. Storm remembered that Martinez had a cell telephone. He remembered the
telephone's number. He dialed the number and asked for a ride.
Given the record facts, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant failed to establish
that Storm's statement was "free of conscious fabrication." SeeHutto, 2000 UT App 188,
^ 12. Because the statement did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, the trial
court properly excluded it from admission.
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POINT III
THE P R O S E C U I O k DID NOT COMMIT l U I M O K B l i J US
CLOSING ARGUMENT WHEN HE SUMIVi \ R 1 / H > f l N D S F Y
ISAKSON'S T E S T I M O N \
During closing argument, the prosecutoi summarized Lindsey Isakson's testimony
desci ibmg w hat occurred v\ I JL n dciendant leit the house attei In mg his gun in the li\ mg room
(R506 ^40) Defendant did

>1 ob|t < 1 to tin pio >oi utofs < h n u ten/ation of that U union .

On appeal, defendant claims foi the fust time that the piosecutor committed
prejudicial misconduct in summarizing Lmdsey's testimony See Br iplt at 46-48. Because
defendant failed to pieseo \ (his issue below he nm t now » ( ihlish ill il his li utl UHIIIM 1 was
ineffective in failing to object and/or that the trial court plainly cried m not sua sponte
correcting the statement. See Coonce, 2001 UT \ p p 355, ff 7-8. Defendant has failed to
( staLi!i li e i l l i )

A. Ike Prosecutor \ Properly
Testimony.

tinned ike Fair Inference

of Lindsey's

Lindsey Isakson testified that she was standing near the front door as defendant exited
doin fbc hoior

mnli ntifVd

black MI\

nil

I h ndanl

' ii

mo llio

i \

Defendant responded "no" and ran out of the house with the gun m his hand. Lindsey
testified that the "black guy" remained in the house See Statement of Facts, supra.
1 indst\ and fl KM ill] n i h i iiilrmo^pd bin " HtM^ ICHM\ eh |iie lionet 1 ihonl lior
pnoi statements to the police (R503: 196-98, 200, 213-15, R505: 511-12, 516-20). She
clarified that the "black man" was in the house when defendant ian oul the door

QUESTION: Now, when you say but I know it was [defendant who fired
outside] because he couldn't give anybody else the gun, by the time when
[you] saw him run out of there he had the gun in his hand. You told [the
detective] when [defendant] ran out the door he had the gun in his hand; is that
right?
ANSWER: Yes.
Q: And you were speculating to Detective Delahunty there's no way that you
think they could exchange the guns, is that right?
A: Yes, there's no way they could have.
Q: Okay.
A: The guy was still in the house at the time when he had run out there.
Q: Okay. What guy?
A: The guy that had asked him to give him the gun.
(R503:215).
In closing argument, defense counsel suggested that House was the "black guy" who
asked for the gun and ultimately shot the victims (R506: 720). Counsel stated that Lindsey
said the "black guy" and defendant ran out of the house together (R506: 726).
In rebuttal, the prosecutor clarified that this was not Lindsey's testimony:
Well, so it seems as though the defense's story that somebody took Lou's gun
from him doesn't so much work out. And if you remember Lindsay Isakson's
testimony, what she said was Lou [defendant] had a conversation in the
doorway with somebody who said give me the gun, give me the gun, and Lou
said no. It's uncontroverted that Lou said no. That Lou walked out the door
with the gun still in his hand, still in his hand. And that the guy that was in the
doorway with him went the other way. That is absolutely critical. Lindsay
[sic] told you Lou went out of the house, the other guy came back in. They
went in completely different opposite directions. Nobody took that gun from
Lou.

m

(R506: 740).
The prosecuior s summary 01 uinaseys ic>iiinon\ - . *;-;op^i.
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"summarize the evidence and its inferences from his or her viewpoint"). Though Lindsey
never described the two as going in "completely diiferent opposite directions,
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B. Because No Error Occurred, Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective
the Trial Court Did Not Plainly Err.

and

Because no misconduct occurred. cic:cnuuiit .- :.:s ir:.:. -oun^ei • JM noi uongaioa \o
object and the trial court was not obligated to intervene. See Kooyman, 2005 UT ' rv 222,
€:

30 (reaffirming that conn .1 is under no obligation to make futile objections). Cf. Cruz,

I.* I-;

i -r .

:•,(recognizing that plain error requires actual error).
POT^

THE PROSEC I I OR DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT WHEN HE
REMINDED THE FURORS THEY W E R E SELECTED T<) " U T AS
THE VOICE AND CONSCIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY" AND
OPINED THAT IF T H E Y CAME BACK W I T H A NOT GUILTY
. VERDICT, "TT TS \ S T R l IE TO SAY THAT THERE HA c RKF V v - )
CRIME"
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to other
portions of the prosecutor s closing argument and in denying a motion to mistrial based on
alleged pro^r •* •;
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the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she told the jurors that they "were
selected to be on this jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community" (R506: 747).
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Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she opined that "if
you say to [defendant] that he is not guilty, it is as true to say that there has been no crime"
(id.). The trial court found the objection untimely, but nevertheless overruled both objections
on the merits and denied defendant's motion for mistrial (R506:751-57). The court's rulings
are correct.
A. A Prosecutor May Remind the Jury that They Act as The Voice and
Conscience of the Community in Adjudicating the Guilt or Innocence of an
Accused.
A prosecutor commits misconduct when he or she call "the jury's attention to matters
which they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict" and the improper
statements "probably influenced the jury verdict." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,1290
(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1994). It is not enough for a prosecutor's
statement to be undesirable. See Harden v. Wainwright, All U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The
defendant must establish that any "'error was substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood, that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.5"
Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1290 (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App.
1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)).
Moreover, the propriety of the prosecutor's comment and any prejudicial effect must
be judged in light of the "totality of the evidence presented at trial." Id. The denial of a
motion for mistrial will not be overturned absent clear abuse of discretion. See State v.
Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997).
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Here, defendant did not timely object when the prosecutor told the jury that in their
role as jurors, they acted as the conscience 01 me c o m m u n i s
"-•' :] \ . ; r ; , ••• - L*-:--.J ,]-;

101 j o.

.. .\everiheless, the
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consistent with the court's o w n comments to the jury (R506: 750-57).
Defendant cites alia^ifiil oi cases in wlnca aitlerent statements b y prosecutors have
been foi md to be u npropei

See Br • i i >lt at : 19. These cases h a \ e little relevance here.

On the other hand, m a n y courts have directly addressed identically-worded arguments
to those m a d e here and all have consistently found no error or harmless error. Compare,
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that "a prosecutor m a y a ^ c a l to the jury to act as the
conscience of the community, so long as the comments are not calculated to inflame")
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Cir. 1992) (reco jin i zing the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' views that a prosecutor may remind
a jury that they "act as a conscience of the community," so long as the comments are not
"specihcauy designee to ir,;.ame tnejuiy ).ccrt. demed.yn
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consider that 'the verdict you return is going to be reflective of the conscience of the
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the community," but completely proper to encourage a jury "to act as the voice and
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conscience of the community"). Consistent with this authority, the trial court properly
overruled defendant's objection,
B. The Prosecutor Fairly Responded to Defendant's Argument by
Rhetorically Discussing a Not Guilty Verdict
As previously noted, the context of a remark must be considered; isolated comments,
even if improper, rarely rise to the level of misconduct. See United States v. SoconyVacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940) (refusing to find prosecutorial misconduct where
improper remarks were isolated and not indicative of party's argument as a whole).
Moreover, defense counsel's own argument may "invite" the prosecutor's challenged
response. See Darden, All U.S. at 182.
Here, defendant invited the response he complains of. Defense counsel explained to
the jury different meanings that could be accorded a not guilty verdict. Defense counsel told
them that a not guilty verdict could mean that defendant did not commit a crime or could
mean that the evidence was insufficient (R506: 735-36).
In rebuttal, the prosecutor opined that if the jury told defendant he was not guilty, "it
is as true to say that there has been no crime" (R506: 747). Defendant objected and asked
for a mistrial (R506: 747, 751-54).
The court overruled the objection and refused to grant a mistrial (R506: 751-55). The
court first found that the prosecutor's comment was no different than what defendant had
argued about not guilty verdicts (id.). The court also found that the prosecutor's comment
was clearly rhetorical: "Kehndra Isakson is dead, so obviously the prosecutor didn't mean
it literally. It's argument. .." (R506: 751-52).
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Because defendant fells to marshal the facts establishing the context of the comment,
his claim siiv^.abe summarily rejected. S ee Widdison, 2001 [ J 1 60, ^60-61 If tl lemei its
arec <* * -Ucivd thv* r-1- - :

rivet. I'T-n. the comment was a fair, albeit not perfectly staled,

response to defense counsel's argument. Compare R506: 735-36, with R506: 747. See also
Barden, 477 U.S. at 181-Q^ Second, even if the statement was improper, it was a single
isolate : ^ente^ce - -.. -t^
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of misconduct justifying a new trial. See Socony-lracuum, 310 U.S. at 242.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing i easons, the State respectfi illy requests that the Com t affirm
defendant's convictions.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
r

i his l ourt luo wiscretion "io determine wmen mailers require u.al argumeni, w men.

16. Mere, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. Cf. Utah R.
App: P. 29(a)(3). Therefoiw. ihe State requests oral argument.
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Addenda

Addendum A

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
R U L E 16. DISCOVERY
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or information of which Tie has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefehdants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tend^ to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the' guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree^ of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 'The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo*
sures at least ten days before trial1" or as soon as practicable. He has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent
improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from
harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the
further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological
or medical reports.(f) Upon a sufficient showing die court may at any time order that ai^covery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected
by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such
an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and
preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court
in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of
the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court,
without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release,
may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be
subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.

RULES OF EVIDENCE
R U L E 8 0 1 . DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant'7 is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay, "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E)
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

R U L E 8 0 3 . HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT
IMMATERIAL
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
m a d e while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
m a d e for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
m a d e or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness'
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorand u m or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies
with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda,
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by
law as to which matters there Was a duty to report, excluding, however, in
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a
public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record,
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or
agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement,
or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages,
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings,
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or
the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
aocument purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a
record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of
documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document,
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a
reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands j n the community, and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the
judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not
affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.
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extremely important that the jury is advised that race or
ethnicity is not to be considered in any respect, not to the
detriment or to the benefit of the defendant.
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

I agree, Judge.
And I don't know that there are any other

stocks that are out of the ordinary or that I want to call to
your attention.
Anything else that we need to discuss tonight?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

No, Judge.
How many witnesses do you intend to call,

Ms. Trease, and who are they?
MS. TREASE:

Do you want our wish list or who we

think we are going to call?
THE COURT:

Why don ! t you give me who you think you

are going to call.
MS. TREASE:

Okay.

We anticipate calling Detective

Todd Park.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

Detective Park.
Either Detective Ray Lopez or

Detective -- either Officer Ray Lopez or Officer Eric Brown.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Marco Etsitty.
Can you spell that for me?

Is that

E-c-s-t-i-t-y?
MS. TREASE:

E-t-s-i-t-t-y, I believe.

R*P4
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Isaac Costello.
Yes.

MS. TREASE:
Smith.

Officer Paul Barker.

Adrian Lewis.

Officer Jeff

Aaron Zippro, Z-i-p-p~r-o.

Pollock, P-o-l-l-o-c-k.

And Stephen Butler.

Matthew

Those are who we

anticipate calling, Judge, although there are other witnesses
that are on our witness list that at this point -THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

What about the defendant?
Judge, until we hear from those

witnesses, I can't say for sure whether he is.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So you have somewhere between 10

to 12 witnesses; is that correct.
MS. TREASE:

Thatf s correct.

And let me indicate

that I don't anticipate that these witnesses will take more
than possibly a half or three-quarters of the day tomorrow.
They will be very short.
THE COURT:

Well, we'll hope that's the case.

And

we'll hope to start with the testimony about quarter to 9:00.
I would ask counsel to be here at 8:30 so we can talk about
jury instructions for a few minutes before beginning.

I'm

assuming that if we get all that testimony on tomorrow, the
State will have Thursday morning to call rebuttal witnesses.
And it may be difficult to anticipate at this point, but do you
have a sense, Mr. Hall, of whether you will be calling any
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rebuttal witnesses?
Your Honor, it f s going to depend obviously

MR. HALL:

on what some of the defense witnesses say.

And I'm trying to

get ahold of the defense's witness list now.

Some of the names

aren't familiar to me, they might be familiar to Ms. Wissler.
THE COURT:

Well, they better be on the

questionnaire.
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, I can assure the Court that

a number of those names are not on the defendant's witness list
and I have some grave concerns about that.
MR. HALL:

That's why I'm trying to find the list.

THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

This is not a good sign.
Wait a minute, Judge.

Not all these

witnesses are on the questionnaire, but every single one of
these witnesses has a transcript that the State has provided to
us

—
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Wait a minute.
—

of their testimony.

Why didn't you disclose your witnesses to

the other side?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, we disclosed our witnesses to the

other side as best we could of who we anticipated calling.
Some of these witnesses we are calling in
THE COURT:

—

Who did you not disclose that is not on

the questionnaire?
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MS. TREASE:

No, they are all on the questionnaire.

All these witnesses are on the questionnaire.
Court f s concern, every one of them
THE COURT:

If that f s the

—

I have two concerns.

I have a concern

about them being disclosed and about them being on the
questionnaire.

If they are on the questionnaire, they f ve been

disclosed is how I look at it.
And that f s —

MS. TREASE:

we —

every single one of

these witnesses is in a police report and we took all the names
in the questionnaire from the police report and from
transcripts of interviews that the State has done in this case.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

So what is your concern, Mr. Hall?
Oh, it's only, your Honor, that it ! s just

that I T m not totally personally familiar with all the names.
Ms. Wissler -- between the two of us perhaps we are.

And I was

just trying to grab the defendant's witness list to make sure
that they had pointed out
THE COURT:

—

Well, if they are on the questionnaire

under the possible witnesses to be called by the defense, then
you are on notice.
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, the concern that the State

has is that the Court specifically ordered both sides in this
case to exchange witness lists on or before November the 7
THE COURT:
MS. WISSLER:

I did.
The defense provided us with a witness

445

list of I think some 15 odd people, something in that
neighborhood, 12, 15 people, and that's the witness list upon
which the State relied.
the questionnaire.

There's obviously a hundred people on

The State didn't call most of those people,

the defense isn't intending to call most of those people.

But

I think the State is entitled to rely upon the witness list
that was ordered to be produced.
THE COURT:

Who was listed on the witness list?

MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, Todd Park was not listed,

Ray Lopez was not listed, Marco Ecstity was not listed.
THE COURT:

Just a minute, you're going to too fast.

MS. WISSLER:

Jeff Smith I don't believe was listed.

And I don't recall whether Adrian Lewis, Aaron Zippro, Matthew
Pollock or Steven Butler were listed.
THE COURT:

Do you think I could write that fast?

MS. WISSLER:

I'm sorry, I didn't know you wanted to

write them down.
THE COURT:

I do.

MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Did you mention a name Lewis?

Didn't you say Adrian Lewis?
Did you say that?

MS. TREASE:

Yes.

THE COURT:

And that was not on the witness list?

MS. WISSLER:

I don't recall, Judge, because we can't

put our hands on a copy of that list.
MR. HALL:

It's in here, I'm digging for it.
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THE COURT:

Who was on your witness list, Ms. Trease?

MS. TREASE:
State

And let me say this, Judge, as the

—
THE COURT:

Before you talk about your rational, who

was on your witness list?
MS. TREASE:

Our witness list includes James Storm,

Heather- Garcia, Jamie Vigil -THE COURT:

None of the people you've mentioned.

MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

That's one.

MS. TREASE:
MR. HALL:

Isaac Costello.

Okay.

MS. TREASE:
Roman.

Matthew Pollock.

Jose Gonzales.

Angle Balderama.

Edwards.

Ashley Nelson.
THE COURT:

Paul Barker.

Paris Page.

Gustavo

Vaun Delahunty.

Carl

And Rafael Haney.

Okay.

So most of the people that you

intend to call were not on your witness list?
MS. TREASE:

They were not, Judge, but these

witnesses, every single one of these witnesses has a
statement -- has made a statement to the State.

They are aware

of these witnesses.
THE COURT:

I know what you're saying.

to withhold a decision until tomorrow.

And I'm going

But I find it extremely

unprofessional that tapes that are provided are not listened to
by both sides or reviewed or viewed by both sides.

That
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witness lists are not pared down.

And that a witness list

that f s accurate is not provided to the other side.

What it

amounts to is it sounds like preparation for the trial was done
the weekend before trial and that by the time of the pretrial
back in early November, none of these decisions had been made.
And now you're asking me to allow the witnesses to testify.
And they weren't on your witness list.

Is that about the gist

of it?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Judge

That preparation was the last weekend?

MS. TREASE:
witnesses —

—

It was not, Judge.

But some of these

we decided not to call certain witnesses because

of some of the evidence that the State
THE COURT:

Why didn't you list these people

MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

—

—
—

presented today

—

—

that you talked about today as

potential witnesses on your witness list that you exchanged
with counsel?
MS. TREASE:

I tried, Judge, to rather than —

I

could have listed all the witnesses in the questionnaire, which
is as the Court knows is close to a hundred witnesses.
THE COURT:

No, what you're supposed to do is list

the people you were going to be calling.
MS. TREASE:
Judge.

Or who we thought we would be calling,

And at the time that we did this, those were the
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witnesses that we thought we would call.
THE COURT:

When did you make the decision to call

the witnesses that you just told me about?
MS, TREASE:
Judge.

Some of them we've made just this week,

In fact, some of them were subpoenaed this week.
THE COURT:

When did you make the decision to call

these witnesses?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

I ! 11 have to check the subpoenas, Judge.
Some of them you knew about before trial

and did not disclose to the other side; is that correct?
MS. TREASE:

Some of them we anticipated possibly

calling today or tomorrow when we put on our case, but -THE COURT:
again.

I'm not getting an answer.

Let me try

And I don't mean to be unfair or unkind, but I'm trying

to figure this out.

You knew that some of the witnesses you

had not listed on your witness lists were going to be called,
that was prior to trial, correct?
MS. TREASE:

I knew they were possibly going to be

called, Judge.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

Why didn't you tell the other side?
I anticipated, Judge, because they

already had the reports, and what we anticipate these witnesses
to testify are the same things that they told the State in this
case, the State already knows about it -THE COURT:

What do you think the purpose of my
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setting a deadline or any
MS. TREASE:

Judge

THE COURT:
witnesses is?

—

—

—

setting a deadline for designation of

Don T t you think that that means that that's the

date by which witnesses needs to be designated?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, as we indicated in our list when

we provided it to the State, this is the list of witnesses that
at the time we anticipated calling, but that there was a
possibility, and we indicated that to the State, that there may
be witnesses not on this list that we might call.

And that it

includes every single witness that the State has —
aware is a potential witness in this case.

is already

All these people

are potential witnesses that the State have talked to.
THE COURT:

I!m aware that there are about a hundred

different witnesses that could have been called.

I still don't

understand why you did not notify the State of who you intended
to call out of that long list.

And I think it's —

I'll

probably allow the witnesses to testify because great latitude
is given to defendants in criminal cases, but I'll be honest
with you, this is unprofessional in my opinion.
real problems with a nondisclosure of witnesses.

And I have
And I have a

hard time understanding why you did not advise the State of
changes in your plans.

And I can't believe that you made all

the changes today.
When did you send out your subpoenas for these
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witnesses?
MS. TREASE:

They were sent out at different times,

Judge, and I can f t answer at this time.
THE COURT:

I'm not getting an answer I guess.

On

Mr. Parks, Detective Park, when did you send out your subpoena?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, to tell you the truth, we haven't

even subpoenaed Detective Park.

I asked Mr, Johnson to call

Detective Park.
THE COURT:

When did you send out your subpoena on

Detective Lopez?
MS. TREASE:

Other than Detective Park which we

talked about today, Judge, I can't answer the question on the
others.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

Do you have copies of what you sent out?
I'm sure we do.

I don't have them with

me here today.
THE COURT:

Well, let me suggest you better get them

because I want to know at what point you made the decision and
whether or not there was an opportunity to tell the State.

I

am of the belief that a criminal trial is not supposed to be a
game of hide the ball.

That both sides, with the exception of

disclosing whether or not the defendant is going to testify,
have an obligation to notify the Court and the other side of
who they will be calling.

And I find it extremely disturbing

that we've had all these issues that have come up that relate
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to last-minute preparation.

It appears that a lot of things

that should have been done well in advance of trial were not
done.

And I want to know in the morning before you call any of

these witnesses when you made the decision to call them.
So Detective Park still hasn't been subpoenaed?
MS. TREASE:

Your Honor, Detective Park was on the

State's witness list.

We anticipated that he would testify.

THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

By you?
He has not been subpoenaed by us.
Who else has not been subpoenaed by you?
It's probably just Detective Park, your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

Everybody else has been subpoenaed?
That's my understanding, although I

haven't seen the subpoenas.
THE COURT:

So you can tell me tomorrow morning at

what point they were subpoenaed?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

I'll do my best.
Well, you ought to have a record of that.
And that's —

I will try to find the

record of that and provide it if that's what the Court is
ordering.
THE COURT:

No, what the Court ordered was that the

names of witnesses to be called be provided by the pretrial
conference.

And that was not done.

What I'm now asking for is

452

an indication of when you chose to subpoena these witnesses.
I'm trying to give you a break here because you obviously did
not disclose them, as you acknowledge, by the date you were
supposed to disclose them.
figured —

I f m trying to figure out when you

determined that you wanted them as witnesses.
MS. TREASE:

I can say this much, the witnesses that

I've mentioned were subpoenaed after we provided the list to
the State because the list -THE COURT:
is when?

I'm sure of that.

But my question to you

If they were subpoenaed before trial, and I'm

assuming they were, I'm wondering why you didn't notify the
State.
MS. TREASE:

Well, I admit, Judge, I haven't notified

the State of these witnesses until right now when you asked me
who they were, the witnesses that were not on the list.
However, I want to impress to the Court
THE COURT:

Can I ask you why?

MS. TREASE:

I assumed, Judge, that they're witnesses

that they've already talked to.
the questionnaire.

—

They are witnesses that are on

They are witnesses that they provided us

statements for.
THE COURT:

Let me get counsel to approach.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:

If there's nothing further, we need the

defense instructions to copy.

And then I think we're in
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THE COURT:

Please be seated.

We ! re here for day

three in the trial of State versus Tiliaia.
number 011915514.

This is case

This morning I ! ve been handed a motion to

exclude the testimony of Marco Etsitty, Adrian Lewis, Aaron
Zippro, and Steven Butler.

These obviously are some of the

people that were named yesterday by the defense as proposed
witnesses.

My understanding is they were on the list of a

hundred witnesses that were provided to the jury as part of the
questionnaire.

They were, however, not provided on the

defendants statement of witnesses that was ordered by the
Court and supposed to be provided at the time of the pretrial.
I haven't had a chance to read it.

It just was

handed to me, so let me ask Ms. Wissler if you 1 re willing to
speak to the issue on the record?
MS. WISSLER:

Certainly, your Honor.

Your Honor, the

motion is supported almost in its entirety by United States

pi^5os Asn-^s^
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Supreme Court case which is referred to on page 4 of the
Statef s memorandum, that' s Taylor versus

Illinois.

If ve

provided the Court with a copy, as well as defense counsel, for
convenience.

I don T t believe that there's any significant

dispute about the facts as set forth in the State's memorandum,
although I'm sure I'll be corrected if I've misstated
something.
Your Honor, the State's position is that in accord
with Taylor

versus

Illinois,

the exclusion of these witnesses

is a perfectly appropriate sanction given the fact that this is
clearly a willful violation of the Court's discovery order.

It

appears as though at least one of these witnesses, and
specifically Marco Etsitty, was subpoenaed perhaps as early as
October the 25

, as reflected in the Court docket as I

reviewed it yesterday.

So it appears as though at least

Mr. Etsitty was known as a witness or a potential witness to
the defense as early as October the 25

' just some three weeks

ago, yet that name was never provided to the State until
yesterday.
The unfortunate part about this, Judge, or maybe it's
fortunate, is that the Court required the defense yesterday to
provide that list of its witnesses, were it not for the Court's
requiring defense to do that, the State simply would have been
caught off guard this morning and completely and utterly
blinded with no time to prepare on these witnesses and or
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cross-examination.

So the State is firmly of the opinion that,

specifically in the case of Mr. Etsitty, the exclusion of his
testimony is a perfectly appropriate sanction.
As the Court is aware, we had a significantly long
discussion at the bench yesterday, during which there were some
conversations about discussions that were had last week between
my co-counsel and counsel for the defendant and it appeared as
though at that time it was known to the defense that they
intended to call witnesses who had not previously been
disclosed; yet in response to the Statefs request for a list of
subpoenaed witnesses, we received nothing.

We were not

informed until yesterday of the defendants intent to call
Mr. Etsitty, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Zippro, or Mr. Butler.

Given the

fact that at least some of these people, perhaps all of them,
were known to the defense as witnesses or potential witnesses
as early as some three weeks ago, and given the fact that the
State had made specific requests of the defense to provide a
list of subpoenaed witnesses, and given the utter lack of any
explanation yesterday on the part of defense counsel, the State
is left to conclude that this was simply a willful violation
that was designed and calculated to provide the defense team
with some strategy or some strategic benefit.

In the absence

of any other explanation, your Honor, I think that conclusion
is inescapable and so we would ask the Court to issue an order
excluding the testimony of those four witnesses.
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THE COURT:

There's an interesting paragraph which

appears to be a quote from the case to which you T ve alluded to
on page 6 of your memorandum, the language in it strikes me as
particularly apropos:

More is at stake than possible prejudice

to the prosecution and we are all concerned with the impact of
this kind of conduct on the integrity of the judicial process
itself.

The trial judge found that the discovery violation in

this case was both willful and blatant in view of the fact the
petitioner's counsel had actually interviewed the witness
during the week before trial.

Further fact, he amended his

answer to discovery on the first day of trial without
identifying the witness while he did identify two actual
eyewitnesses who he did place on the stand.
We don't even have a situation here where there is an
identification of the witnesses on the first day of trial.
Would you like to respond to this Ms. Trease?

I'd be

interested in knowing what I asked yesterday, when did you
subpoena these witnesses?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, when the Court indicated

yesterday that you were not interested in that, I did not look
as I had

—
THE COURT:

Is it true that one of the witnesses,

Mr. Etsitty, was subpoenaed in October?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, it might have been.

If the

return that's on that day --
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THE COURT:

On an issue of this importance you

havenf t checked?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, when you indicated that you were

going to take what had been represented yesterday as what
occurred in this case, I assumed that the Court would do that.
And that may very well be true, Judge.

We filed our list of

witnesses, we included in that list, as the State did also,
that there may be other witnesses that we may call depending on
what occurs in this case.

There are a lot of witnesses that we

subpoenaed that we don't intend to call given what the State -THE COURT:

Unfortunately the witnesses you do intend

to call were not designated.

And maybe you have an explanation

today, you didn't yesterday afternoon.

Do you have an

explanation for why those names were not provided?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, the explanation I gave the Court

yesterday is the explanation that we have.

When we provided

that list to the State we made it clear to the State, as they
did when they provided us their list, that as we prepare for
trial there may be changes.
THE COURT:

Well, there is a Court order in place

that witnesses were to be designated by a certain time.

If the

prosecution had failed to designate witnesses, there would be
no question that you would be on your feet asking me to exclude
those witnesses and I'd be granting the motion.

I don't know

why I should treat it differently because it's the defense.

463

Let me ask you one additional question.

Did you say

to Mr. Hall last week, on approximately Thursday, I may be
surprising you with some additional witnesses?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, I did not say that.

What I said

to him was we may provide or we may use as an exhibit a tape
recording of the sentencing of one of the witnesses that the
State may call that is a codefendant that was offered a deal by
the State to testify.

I told him that we had discussions about

whether or not the tape recording was admissible.
THE COURT:

So you're saying that there was no

discussion with Mr. Hall about witnesses that might be a
surprise or other witnesses you might be calling?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, I would not do that to the State.

I would not bring in witnesses that
THE COURT:

—

That means you 1 re saying Mr. Hall

misrepresented yesterday?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, I don't recall that conversation.

But let me say this, every single witness that we intend to
call today is a witness that the State has known is a potential
witness for over a year.
THE COURT:

You have a duty to disclose your

witnesses, why didn ! t you do so?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

We

—

There are on the list of witnesses in the

questionnaire I think over a hundred witnesses.

They can't be
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expected, nor can you be expected, to prepare for all of those
witnesses, which is why there was an order in place that at the
time of the pretrial each side was to disclose to the other
side who they actually intended to call.
the may calls and the will calls.

The distinction being

If this were a civil case

there would be no question, I wouldn't even hesitate, I would
exclude the witnesses.
Let me ask you this, will you make a proffer to me of
what each of these witnesses are going to say, starting with
Mr. Etsitty.
MS. TRKA.SE:

Mr. Etsitty, Judge, will testify in

regards to he was at the party and, again, as a part of the
record would indicate that —
previously by the State
THE COURT:

Marco Etsitty was interviewed

—

Okay, what I'm asking, Ms. Trease

—

we're running out of time, what I'm asking is what is the
proffer you're making of what he would say.
MS. TREASE:

He will testify about what he told the

police at the time that he was interviewed.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

What will he testify to?
Let me defer to counsel that's going to

question Mr. Etsitty.
THE COURT:

So you don't even know what he's going to

say?
MS. TREASE:

Well, there's three of us, Judge
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—

THE COURT:

Okay.
Your Honor, it ! s anticipated that I will

MR. HOWARD:

be questioning Mr. Etsitty.

What's anticipated that he will be

testifying to is that he was at the party.
shots.

That he heard a black man —

shooting.

That he heard

or saw a tall black guy

He would testify further -- I think he would testify

regarding what Mr. Tiliaia was wearing and regarding some
conversations with a Zeke and Rafael.
THE COURT:

Okay.

What will Mr. Adrian Lewis be

testifying to?
MS. TREASE:

Your Honor, at this time I don't think

we will call Mr. Lewis.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Are you agreeing you will not call him?
Yes.
All right.

That takes us to Aaron

Zippro, what will he be testifying to?

Is there a proffer on

that?
MS. KOCH:

Your Honor, if Mr. Zippro does testify, he

will testify that he was at the party and he talked to the
officer and told the officer that he saw two males exiting the
party, one carrying a gun, and he describes the one male was
wearing a light blue shirt walking out the front door and
another male was wearing a yellow shirt.
THE COURT:

Will he be identifying who those people

were that were carrying the guns?
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MS. KOCH:

He does not identify so in his police

report.
THE COURT:

All right.

Have you had a conversation

with him where that question was put to him?
MS. KOCH:

I have not had the opportunity to talk to

Mr. Zippro.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. TREASE:

And what about Mr. Butler?

Mr. Butler will testify consistent with
+"T"i

his statement to police on his interview of November 5

of

last year that he saw a black male with afro-style hair wearing
shorts coming out of the house, jumped off the porch, pointed a
gun at the house and he fired.

That he thinks this is the same

person that he saw earlier that night with a pick in his hair.
And this is consistent with his interview with the police.
THE COURT:

Would you like to respond again,

Ms. Wissler?
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, what I would like to

present the Court is a copy of the page of the docket of this
case that indicates the date on which Mr. Etsitty was
subpoenaed which is clearly, according to the docket, the 25
of October of this year.
THE COURT:

You did not, however, have this

information until yesterday?
MS. WISSLER:

That's correct, your Honor.

that's the -- your Honor, I take that back.

Well,

That is a document
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that Mr. Hall and I looked up on our computer on Saturday
afternoon as we were in our office making our final trial
preparations.

And in the sheer hope that we may discover

something from the court docket, we located that docket for the
first time.

We had not been told by the defense or anyone else

that that person would actually be called as a witness.

And if

the Court will notice, there are three other people on that
list who were subpoenaed by the defense who evidently aren f t
being called as witnesses.
THE COURT:

Costello and Roman?

MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Yes.

William.

All right.

exclude the witness ! s testimony.

I'm going to

As I said yesterday, I'm not

only concerned about the defendant getting a fair trial, I f m
also concerned about what is appropriate conduct by counsel.
And in this case I f m not going to condone the fact that a
witness was subpoenaed on October 25

and not -- the State was

not notified of that until the middle of trial.
grave concerns about it.
the prosecution, Taylor

I have some

And it appears that the case cited by
versus

Illinois,

is directly on point.

Mr. Etsitty will not be testifying.
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

Your Honor, may I interrupt?
Yes.
Just so the record is clear, the Court

made a comment that may be a finding and just so I can have the

L
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benefit of the record briefly, if the Court would indulge me?
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

Surely.
The discussion yesterday that we had at

the bench I approached with great hesitation because I f m
extremely reluctant to address to the Court recollections of
verbal conversations between me and anybody else.

As everyone

appreciates, while no one surely in this court has got any
intention to be deceptive, recollections can honestly differ.
So if I could just relay to the Court precisely my recollection
of the discussion with the defense counsel on Thursday.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

Certainly.
It was at a roll call, your Honor, where

Ms. Trease approached me with a renewed request for wrap sheets
for witnesses that she had requested and that we had not
provided to her at that time.

I indicated to Ms. Trease that I

had asked the paralegal in our office to run those wrap sheets
and that I was making every effort to get them to her as fast
as possible.

I then responded something to the effect of, and

how about another witness list from you that has the people you
intend to call?

And Ms. Trease indicated, as I recall, we

don't know exactly who we're going to call, it's going to
depend on what goes on, but there may be some witnesses that
weren't on our witness list and that there may be some evidence
that's not on the evidence list.

And I said, in effect, excuse

me, I'm sorry, what do you mean?

And then Ms. Trease said,
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well, specifically one bit of evidence was a videotape of a
witness who the State anticipated on calling in terms of
impeachment evidence.

And I didn't really address that other

than to say, well, Ifll tell Ms. Wissler whatever it is you
want me to tell her, but when I go back to the office and relay
this to her I think we're going to have an issue.
Actually, Ms. Wissler took it in much better stride
than I thought, frankly.

And so our discussion from then

ensued that we probably ought to reexamine who was on the
witness list.

Ms. Trease did not indicate to me that she was

going to surprise me with a witness.

She never indicated to me

that she had somebody -- it was clearly a discussion of
witnesses and evidence together in the same conversation that
may not be on the list.
Now, I didn't explore that further with her because
frankly I didn't know exactly procedurally how to do it.
THE COURT:

She alluded to the fact that they might

be calling witnesses that were not on the list?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

That's my recollection, your Honor.
And she did not give you those names at

that time?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Okay.
And I

~

Well, based upon not that conversation --
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MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Judge
—

—

but the fact that the subpoena went

out on Mr. Etsitty on October 25

, which indicates clearly

that the defense knew they would be calling this witness, I'm
not going to allow testimony from Mr. Etsitty.
Yes, Counsel.
MS. TREASE:

Your honor, if I could just have a

minute to indicate the State has indicated that the case that
they provided is on all fours not compared to this case.

The

case the State provided, Judge, talks about witnesses that the
State did not know about.

Witnesses that the State had never

talked to, witnesses that the State had never interviewed, and
based on that the Court excluded those witnesses.
I want to reiterate for the record that the witnesses
that we intend to call, even though they were not provided on
our original witness list, are witnesses that the State has
talked to, they have transcripts of interviews with these
witnesses, these witnesses were identified on the questionnaire
as potential witnesses and the information that we have on
those witnesses comes from that.

And what we intend for them

to testify about today is very similar to the information or
the interviews that they already have given to the State.
THE COURT:
MS. WISSLER:

You want to speak to that issue?
I do, your Honor.

To suggest that the

questionnaire in this case amounts somehow to notice that the
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defense intended to call these witnesses is ridiculous.
I ! m not buying that.

THE COURT:
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

There are 152 names on that list.

What ITm asking, I guess, Counsel, is

Ms. Trease has indicated that there ought to be more latitude
given to the defense, as I understand it, because you have had
interviews or have had a chance to talk to these witnesses; do
you want to speak to that issue?
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, these witnesses were

interviewed in excess of a year ago by the police.

Because of

the nature of their statements, they were never contacted
again.

They were -- essentially their transcripts were read,

their testimony was deemed to have no evidentiary value to the
State and they were put aside with the other 140 some odd
people that were listed on that list.

The State has had no

meaningful opportunity to speak to these people, we've had no
opportunity at all let alone a meaningful opportunity.

Since

we found out that they were called to be witnesses we certainly
are entitled to go out, reinterview those people and ask them
questions.

We've had no opportunity to do that.

We based our

trial strategy upon the witness list we were given which is
evidently just a random list of people, most of these people
aren f t being called as witnesses, and there are these seven
other people that are being called.
Our trial strategy has been compromised and has been
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prejudiced based upon their violation of your order.

Not only

that, your Honor, but the State may have and in fact likely
would have called different witnesses in rebuttal had we known
that these individuals were going to be called.

We don ! t have

the opportunity to subpoena these other people now.
THE COURT:
them.

Well, you had the opportunity to contact

I guess you don ! t have the opportunity clearly to

subpoena them.
MS. WISSLER:

I don't, your Honor.

In fact, one of

the individuals that we would have called as a rebuttal witness
or at least attempted to call as a rebuttal witness I attempted
to make contact by telephone last night at 7:00 o'clock, the
only telephone number we have for that person is disconnected.
We've had no opportunity to investigate that person's current
whereabouts.

There's absolutely no way that we could have

adequately prepared for the cross-examination of these
witnesses.

And not only the cross-examination of the

witnesses, but the impact that these witnesses have on the
State's presentation of its evidence.

There's no

underestimating the prejudicial effect that this nondisclosure
has had on the State's case.
Taylor

And that's what the crux of the

case is all about, your Honor, it's that the State

should not be prejudiced because the defense, for strategic or
other reasons, chooses to willfully violate a Court order,
which is exactly what occurred in this case.

The State should
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not be prejudiced and our case should not be compromised any
more than the defendants should because of this willful
violation, that ! s why the sanction is appropriate, your Honor.
THE COURT:

You may respond to that if you wish.

like to hear why you haven ! t disclosed these names.
gotten an adequate explanation to that.
MS. TREASE:

Ifd

I've never

Give me a good reason.

Judge, when we provided our original

witness list that's who we thought we wanted to call at that
time.
THE COURT:

Yes, and since that time you have changed

your mind, why haven't you notified the State?
MS. TREASE:

Since that time because of evidence that

the witness has presented, we subpoenaed a lot of people that
we didnf t intend to call, some of those people we had to
subpoena to even get them to talk to us because they are
witnesses that are reluctant to talk to us, they are witnesses
that are on the State's side.
THE COURT:

Let me see if I understand what you're

saying because it's not making a great deal of sense to me.
Are you saying that you didn't decide who to call until the
middle of trial?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

Judge, some of the witnesses -What are you saying, Ms. Trease?
I'm saying some of the witnesses we did

not decide to call until the State had put on their case.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

And that certainly could not be

true of Mr. Etsitty.
MS. TREASE:

We subpoenaed Mr. Etsitty, Judge, but

we've been juggling witnesses and trying to decide who we're
going to call.

Even this morning we have decided to not call

certain witnesses and that's because, Judge, the defense has to
listen to what the State has to offer before deciding what to
put on.

The State has the burden and just because we have a

certain list of witnesses, Judge, doesn't mean that's who we're
going to put on.
THE COURT:

That is what it means, Ms. Trease.

When

the Court says you must designate your witnesses, you must.
And I am very lenient about allowing late disclosure of
witnesses.

If you had amended or supplemented your witness

list even as late as last Friday, my ruling would be different;
but you did not.

And if we were talking about one witness, it

would be one thing.
witnesses.

We're talking about four different

I'm not going to allow Mr. Etsitty to testify.
I will consider the issue of Mr. Zippro and

Mr. Butler again.

Are they here this morning?

MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

They aren't.
How come?
Judge, we subpoenaed them, we called

them, again these two individuals are witnesses that are
reluctance to come forward and testify and they're not here.
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THE COURT:

So the State doesn't even have a chance

to interview them before they are called, that was what I was
hoping could occur and then I could give you the opportunity to
call the witnesses.

But they1re not even here; is that the

idea?
Judge, I don ! t know why they're not

MS. TREASE:
here,
THE COURT:
is

Okay.

All right, well, the bottom line

—

MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:
on October 25

I -—

Mr. Etsitty who was clearly subpoenaed

will not be testifying.

As to the other two

witnesses that the defense has indicated they may be calling,
Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler, if the State has an opportunity to
interview them at least an hour before they take the stand, I
will reconsider that issue.

If that is not made available to

them, it ! s not going to occur.
You indicated, Ms. Trease, that you would have all of
your witnesses here ready to go this morning, as I understood
it.

And these witnesses are not even here at this late date

for anyone to interview them.

But I will leave the door open

on Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler if, as I said, the State has at
least an hour to talk to them prior to them being called as
witnesses.
I am relying on the case cited.

I am also relying on
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basic principles of equity and the fact that this is not a
run-of-the-mill trial.

This is a homicide trial where the

expectation is that both sides are going to be well prepared.
And frankly, my observation is that the defense has been
extremely well prepared, they have had their questioning and
their total preparation very well handled, indicating that they
have known all along how they wanted to try this case.

This is

not a case where the defense has not made a good showing in
terms of representation of their client.

On the contrary,

we've had a display from the defense of excellent
representation.

And consequently, I cannot find that this was

an error or just an omission on the part of the defense.
Theref s very careful preparation that's occurred here, shown by
the excellent performance of defense counsel.

That it appears

that it was a choice, especially since Mr. Etsitty, as
indicated, was subpoenaed as long ago as October 25

. And I f m

assuming that he was talked to by the defense on or about that
time or prior to that time since certainly one would not call a
witness one has not talked to.
Again, I ! m leaving open the question of whether
Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler can testify if they show up and the
State has an opportunity to talk to them an hour before they
testify, they may be allowed to go forward.
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Mr. Butler is apparently here, Judge.
All right.

Would you like to go talk to
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him?

We'll keep the jury waiting, I guess.
MR. HOWARD:

Your Honor, for purposes of the record,

when the Court asked for the proffer of what Mr. Etsitty was
going to testify to, I've tried to keep it in general terms.
THE COURT:

Well, you didn't talk about Mr. Etsitty,

I think Ms. Trease did.
MR. HOWARD:

1

Actually, Judge, I'm the one who gave

the proffer on Mr. Etsitty.
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

I'm mistaken.
So I would like to give a more detailed

proffer.
THE COURT:

It doesn't matter, he's not going to

testify.
MR. HOWARD:

For purposes of the record I would like

to make that proffer.
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

Go ahead.
If I may.
Have you talked to Mr. Etsitty?

1

Judge, we did speak with Mr. Etsitty.
When?
I'm not sure of the exact date.

I

believe -THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

Well, give me a ballpark figure.
He was I believe sometime at the end of

October.
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THE COURT:

All right.

the last day of October?

Would that have been before

Would that have been before you

subpoenaed or after you subpoenaed him?
MR. HOWARD:

I don ! t have a specific recollection of

the exact date.
THE COURT:

And you can't say whether it was before

or after you subpoenaed him, but you T re sure it was in October?
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

I believe it was in October.
Was it or wasn't it?
I can only tell the Court what I recall,

and I believe that it was in October.
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

All right.

You may make your record.

My understanding, based on the interview

that Mr. Etsitty gave to the police and also our brief
conversations with him, was that he did go to the party on
September 29

at the address in question in this case.

in the basement of the house.

He was

He heard a fight or some sort of

noise going on upstairs, tried to go upstairs to see what was
going on but was unable to because the stairs were packed and
therefore he exited the house through a basement window.

Went

through the backyard, jumped over the fence, still heard some
shooting coming from the front yard, looked back and saw a
black person shooting, describes him as being a tall black guy.
Indicated to the police during his interview that there were no
front lights, that it was dark both when he left and when he
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arrived at the party.

That he did not know where Lou, the

defendant in this case, went.

And further, that he had

subsequent conversations with Ezekiel House and Rafael Haney
wherein those two threatened him if he said anything to the
police about those two.

That he -- he interpreted their

threats to be essentially a death threat.
THE COURT:

Who threatened him, I ! m sorry, I missed

that part?
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

Excuse me?
Who did he contend threatened him?
Ezekiel House and Rafael Haney, both of

whom are black males who were at the party.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

My ruling remains the same.

Okay, thank you for the proffer.
I would suggest that we take a

short break to give the prosecution a chance to talk to, is it
Mr. Zippro who is here or Mr. Butler or both?
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

I believe it ! s Mr. Butler.
Okay.

Do you have a date on the notes

that you were referring to, referring to your meeting with
Mr. Etsitty?
MR. HOWARD:

Judge, the notes that I was referring to

while making the proffer were notes based on notes I took from
the police interview that was provided to us by the State.
THE COURT:

So you didn ! t make any notes when you

interviewed him yourself?
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1

MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

_

_

_

|

Have you interviewed him?
I did speak with him in October.
And there were no notes from that

conversation?
MR. HOWARD:

My recollection is what he told us

essentially, and this is my recollection, was that his story
seemed consistent with his police interview.
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

1

My question was did you make any notes?
I don't believe so, no.
Okay.

All right.

Let me give the State

an opportunity to talk to Mr. Butler who appears to be the only
one who is here; is that correct?
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

That's my understanding.
And both Mr. Zippro and Mr. Butler were

subpoenaed for this morning, is that correct, or advised to be
here this morning?
MS. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Yes, Judge.
Okay.

1

You may go ahead and talk to

1

Mr. Butler.
MR. HALL:
MR. HOWARD:
matter?

Thank you, your Honor.

1

Your Honor, may I address an unrelated

And this is again something that I believe needs to be

taken care of
THE COURT:

Yeah, but time is ticking and we've got a
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jury waiting.
MR. HOWARD:

We would like to make a record of an

objection that was made yesterday at the bench and this is in
relation to State's Exhibit 34, a photograph of the living room
of the house.
picture —

This is the photograph that contained a

or at the bottom of the photograph there was a hand

and a foot belonging to the deceased in this case.

We had

objected to that on the grounds that the relevance the State
wanted to introduce the photo for was to show what the window
treatments or lack thereof were on the front window.
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

And the lighting.
And to show the lighting.
Since it was taken while the body was

still there it gives it a time as well as the content.
MR. HOWARD:

Our position, for the record, would be

that the detective through whom that photograph was introduced
was perfectly capable of telling when the photograph was taken.
The presence of the body was not necessary to establish when
the photograph was taken.

We believe that the photograph is

unnecessary, it's irrelevant at least in terms of the presence
of the hand and the foot, and that a redacted or cropped
version of the photo would be equally suitable to achieve the
StateT s intended purpose.
THE COURT:

If I cropped the photograph before

allowing the jury to take it into the jury room, would you
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stipulate that that photograph had in it a photograph of the
body and the victim?
MR. HOWARD:

I believe the photograph has already

been published to the jury.
If m aware of that, Counsel, and that

THE COURT:
wasn't my question.

Are you listening to what I'm saying?

MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

I am, Judge.
I am saying that I am considering

cropping it at this point so that when they go into the jury
room to deliberate it will —

they will have a cropped version.

I am aware obviously that they've seen it once.

Now, my

question to you is, will you stipulate and agree that this was
taken while the body was still in the room?

Because an issue

has been made of the fact that there was no lighting in the
house.

And there has been a question about what the status of

the lighting was at the time of the killing.

Now that's my

question to you.
MR. HOWARD:

Judge, we would stipulate that the body

was still in the room, but we would in no way stipulate that
that was the lighting condition when the critical events in
this case occurred.

The photograph was taken —

it's not clear

exactly how long after the death and after the shooting.
we would in no way stipulate that the light was on
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

—

All right.
—

when the events occurred.
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And

THE COURT:

So it becomes a critical question and I f m

going to allow the photograph.
gruesome photograph.

And it is not in my opinion a

I have precluded the use of several

gruesome photographs depicting the body and in the manner in
which it was lying, finding that they are more prejudicial than
probative.
arm.

This photograph, however, just shows a leg and an

I do not find it to be gruesome in any respect.

I find

it to be highly probative of an issue before the trier of fact,
and that is what the lighting situation was, whether or not
there were draperies at the window.

And since there is an

issue in defense's mind as to whether there was lighting on,
becomes very clear that that photograph is a key piece of
evidence.

And as they say, a photograph is worth a thousand

words.
Since one of the issues has been whether or not the
law enforcement officers? recollection and the witnesses!
recollection of whether or not the room was lit is a key issue,
this goes to that issue and I believe will aid the trier of
fact in making an assessment of whether there was lighting or
whether there wasn't.

You're certainly entitled to

cross-examine on that issue, asking witnesses if the lighting
was the same as it was in the photograph at the time of the
shooting.

But I'm going to allow the photograph.

Since there

is no stipulation as to the fact that the body was there and
the lighting was as depicted in the photograph, I'll let the
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finder of fact make that assessment.
Is there anything further?
MS. TREASE:

Judge, one last issue since the State

has rested in this case.
THE COURT:

Just one moment.

Mr. Hall, do you want

to go outside and start talking with this witness because we 1 re
losing time?
MR. HALL:

No, actually, your Honor,

Detective Delahunty has started that process already.

Thank

you.
THE COURT:
MS. TREASE:

All right.

Yes, Ms. Trease.

Since the State has ended their case,

Judge, we would make this motion at this time.

I feel that

this is the appropriate time to make a motion to dismiss for
the StateTs failure to meet its burden before the defense puts
on their case.
THE COURT:
denied.

All right.

So noted.

And the motion is

There has been a great deal of evidence adduced by at

least two eyewitnesses that are uncontroverted at this juncture
as to the charges indicating probable cause to believe it
occurred and the defendant was the shooter and it's an issue
for the finder of fact.

The motion to dismiss as to any or all

of the counts is denied.
All right, would you like to take some time and talk
to the witness?
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MS. WISSLER:

I would, your Honor.

And I would also

like for clarification, if I could from Counsel, I was looking
through this transcript of Mr. Etsitty ! s testimony and for

—

or his interview, I ! ve read this interview three times last
night and I read it again this morning, and I was following
along with counsel as he was making his proffer, and I don't
find any reference in this transcript to any threat that was
made by any person, not —
House.

let alone Rafael Haney or Ezekiel

So if counsel would be kind enough to direct me to a

page to which he f s referring.
THE COURT:

Mr. Howard, would you indicate to counsel

where that reference is located?
MR. HOWARD:

Judge, that may have been discussed in

October when I spoke to him.
interview.

I

It may not be from the police

—

THE COURT:

Are you able to find a reference to that

in the interview transcript?
MR. HOWARD:

Judge, on page 17 at the bottom of the

page he makes reference to running into Rafael at Papiyons, a
club that he had gone to a couple of days after —
days after the events in this case.

a couple of

It was at that club and

this -- I don't see a specific reference in the police
interview to threats, but it was that encounter with Rafael at
Papiyons.
THE COURT:

And that was told to you rather than put
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in the report or the transcript; is that correct?
MR. HOWARD:

That may be, yes.

police interview, it must have been
THE COURT:

If it's not in the

—

I'm asking you is it in the police

interview.
MR. HOWARD:

I did not see a specific reference to

the threats in the police interview.
THE COURT:

All right.

You have an answer to that

question.
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Who is your first witness going to be?

Hopefully someone on the witness list.
MS. TREASE:

Your Honor, Jacob Valdez is on the

State's witness list, we told Mr. Hall yesterday that we
intended to call him since he was not called by the State.

I

believe he will be our first witness.
MS. WISSLER:
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

There's no objection, your Honor.

There's no objection, your Honor.
Would you like to proceed or would you

like to wait until you've had an opportunity to talk to
Mr. Butler?

I can indicate to you that at such point as

Ms. Trease or co-counsel wishes to call Mr. Butler, if you
haven't had a full hour to talk to him I won't allow him to
take the stand until that has occurred.

I'd like to move

forward.

487

Addendum C

Q - ^ ( ^ fo^ ^ORIGINAL
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

)

Plaintiff,

)

VS

CASE NO. 011915514

SERUKA TILIAIA,
r

/

Defendant.

Jury Trial
VOLUME III

)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
NOVEMBER 20, 2002
ritEU SiSTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC - 9 2(3
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.
Deputy CJerfc

REPORTED BY:

Jody Edwards, CSR, RPR, RMR, CRR
238-7378

2MW/03/)-C/f

xs

1

Q

—

2

A

I had heard good things about her.

3

friends changed

4
5

j

THE COURT:

Your Honor, objection, nonresponsive.
Sir, the question is were you acquainted

with her at all?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

Q

9

No.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Were you familiar with the Isakson

family at all?

10

A

11

13

One of my best

—

MS. WISSLER:

6

12

acquainted with her at all?

I knew her -- her youngest sister from school, Kearns

High School.
I

Q

Do you have any bad feelings toward the Isakson

family?

14

A

I feel real bad.

15

Q

Now, after you heard shots being fired that night,

16
17
18

did you receive a phone call from anyone?
A

Yeah, I got a phone call from one of my second

cousins.

19
20

Real bad.

MS. WISSLER:
Q

21

Objection, nonresponsive.

(BY MR. HOWARD)
THE COURT:

And --

The question is after the shoots were

22

fired that night, did you receive a phone call from anyone?

23

That can be answered yes or no.

24
25

THE WITNESS:
Q

Yes.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

And this is a yes or no question,

R . 5 0 5 5^3-355
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I f ll follow it up.
He T s answered it yes.

THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
Q

Yes.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Who did you receive that phone call

from?
A

James.

Q

Do you know Jamesf last name?

A

It f s Storm.

Q

How do you know James?

A

I know James through my —

he ! s -- his sister had a

baby by my cousin, so he f s my cousin.
Q

How long have you known James?

A

For about eight years.

Q

Have you had many conversations with James?
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, I ! m going to object, it ! s

irrelevant and beyond the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT:

Please approach.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:

Miguel, can you get that question for me

from the jury?
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
Q

Should we wait?
No.
Okay.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Are you familiar with what James'

voice typically sounds like?
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A

Yes.

Q

Have you had phone conversations with him?

A

Yes.

Q

Did his voice sound unusual?

A

Yes.
THE COURT:

The comment from the jurors is we can't

hear the questions, we can't hear the answers.
you need to speak up.

So, Counsel,

And you need to speak louder and into

the microphone if you would, please,
THE WITNESS:
Q

I'm sorry.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

I'll try to keep my voice up.

Did

James' voice sound unusual to you when you got that phone call?
A

Yes.

Q

In what way was it unusual?

A

He sounded like he was startled.

Q

What -- can you elaborate on that, what did you mean

by startled?
A

Just stuttering, because he told me he saw something.

Q

He was stuttering?

A

Like he was I —

I —

I —

I —

I —

I —

I just saw

Zeke and Raf shoot Kehndra.
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Objection, your Honor, move to strike.
Sustained.

disregard what you just heard.
you never heard it.

You are to absolutely
Put it out of your mind as if

It was an improper response.

Do not
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consider that in any way whatsoever.
Q

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Does James normally stutter when he

speaks?
A

No.

Q

Was his tone of voice different?

A

Yes.

Q

How was it different?

A

It was different, he was screaming, yelling.

Q

Is that how he normally talks?

A

No, he doesn't.

Q

Did he tell you why he seemed upset?
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

Objection, calls for hearsay.
Sustained.
Judge, we 1 re trying to lay the

foundation for why this is an excited utterance.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

Please take the baby out.
Let me get counsel to approach.
(Side-bar conference.)
Q

(BY MR. HOWARD)

When did you receive this phone

call?
A

I had received it right when I had got to my car, it

was probably like 12 minutes after the shooting.
Q

Twelve minutes after you had heard the shots?

A

Yeah, or ten minutes.

I don f t know.

L
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Q

Did James give any indication to you why he —

why he

was upset or excited?
A

Yes.
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, calls for hearsay.
The question called for a yes or no

answer and he said yes.

Follow-up questions may in fact

require hearsay, but the last question did not.
Q

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Did he tell you whether he had seen

something unusual?
A

Yes.
THE COURT:

It may be answered yes or no.

THE WITNESS:
Q

Yes.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Did he tell you whether he had seen

something that had shaken him up?
A

Yes.

Q

Did he tell you what he had seen?

A

Yes.

Q

Was it something that would normally shake or disturb

a person?
A

Yes.
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, objection, leading, and it

calls for speculation.
THE COURT:
MS. WISSLER:

Sustained on both bases.
I ! d move to strike that response, your

Honor.
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THE COURT:

The response is stricken.

Please

disregard it.
(Counsel confer off the record.)
Q

(BY MR. HOWARD)

The conversation that you had with

James Storm, was it calm and collected?
A

No.

Q

Was he making relaxed statements or was he blurting

things out?
A

He was blurting things out.

Q

Were you asking him questions?

A

I just —

Q

Did he tell you what had excited him?

A

Yes.

yeah, he just —

THE COURT:
Q

yeah.

Yes.

You can answer yes or no.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

What did he tell you had excited

him?
MS. WISSLER:
hearsay

Objection, your Honor, calls for

—
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:
THE COURT:

Sustained.
Judge, the basis for getting
Counsel, please approach.

—

We are not

going to argue in front of the jury.
(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:
MS. WISSLER:

Did you have a voir dire question?
I -- your Honor

—
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATICN
BY MS. WISSLER:
Q

Mr. Cosstello, you indicated to Mr. Howard here that

you spoke to James Storm 12 minutes after this incident
occurred; is that right?
A

Twelve minutes?

Yeah, I was just getting —

from the time that I had

got to my car.
Q

Okay.

But in fact, you told the police that you

didn't speak with James until the day after the shooting,
didn ! t you?
A

No, I had told the officers I talked to him.

Q

Would it refresh your memory as to what you told the

police if I showed you the transcript?
A

Yeah.

Q

With benefit of that transcript, it's true, is it

not, that you told the detective that you did not speak to
James until the day after the shooting?
A

Yes.

DIRECT EXZMDSlATiasr CCNTD.
BY MR. HOWARD:
Q

Isaac, was James at the party that night?

A

Yes.

Q

You saw him?
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A

Yes.

Q

You heard a fight occur upstairs; is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

Did that scare you?

A

Yes.

Q

Did that excite you?

A

Startled me.

Q

And by excited, I don't mean in a good way

necessarily, but either good or bad, were you excited?
A

Yeah.

Q

Did it shake you up?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you know if James was there when the fight

occurred?
A

Yes.

Q

Was he there when the fight occurred?

A

He was upstairs.

Q

Were other people who were there at the party

disturbed or shaken up when the fight occurs?
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:
Q

Objection, calls for speculation.
Sustained.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Did they appear to you to be shaken

or disturbed when the fight occurred?
THE COURT:

Hef s indicated that he did not go

upstairs.
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Q

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Were the people in the basement

excited or disturbed?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you talk to James regarding events that occurred

at the party?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you talk to him about the fight?

A

Yes.

Q

Did he make any indications to you about what he

observed during the fight?
A

Yes.

Q

Did he appear to be shaken by what he had observed?

A

Yes.

Q

What did he tell you he observed?
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Q

Objection, calls for hearsay.
Sustained.

(BY MR. HOWARD)

Now, you say you saw Zeke and

Rafael at the party?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall what Rafael was wearing?

A

No.

Q

Do you recall what Zeke was wearing?

A

Dark clothes.

Q

Do you know what Zeke!s hair was like?

A

Yeah, he had an afro.

I can't recall.
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Q

Did he have anything in his hair?

A

A pick.

Q

What about Rafael's hair?

A

He had braids on right then.

Q

Did he have anything else in his hair?

A

There might have been a do rag.

Q

What do you mean by a do rag?

A

I don f t know.

It's like a rag you throw over your

I don ! t know.

head.
Q

Made of cloth, I assume?

A

Yeah, made of cloth.

Q

Can you describe generally what it looks like?

A

It just ties like down right here, and then you tie

it back here.
THE COURT:

Pointing to his forehead as being the

area covered and the back of the head.
MR. HOWARD:

I have nothing further.

THE COURT:

Cross?

MS. WISSLER:

If I could have just have a minute,

your Honor.
Nothing further from the State, your Honor.
THE COURT:
assistance.

You may stand down.

Thank you for your

You are excused.

Next witness.
MS. KOCH:

Your Honor, at this time the State would
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call Matthew Pollock,
THE COURT:
at this time.

We 1 re going to take a ten-minutes recess

Forgive me.

The people on the jury are probably

feeling precisely the same way, and counsel probably.
We f re going to take a ten-minute recess.

Remember

not to discuss the case, not to form an opinion, but continue
to keep an open mind.

Forgive me.

(A brief recess.)
(The following proceedings were held in open court
out of the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

Okay, we're back on the record.

Is there anything before we bring in the jury?
MR. HOWARD:

Judge, if I could have benefit of the

record in relation to some of the things that were discussed at
the bench during the last break.
THE COURT:
MR. HOWARD:

Just a moment.

You may proceed.

We would like to make the proffer as to

what the previous witness, Isaac Costello Martinez, would have
testified to in relation to a phone call he received from James
Storm.

He had testified that he received that phone call 12

minutes or so after he had jumped over the fence.
would be that James would —

Our proffer

that Isaac would have testified

that during that phone call James told him that he was still
walking away from the party and that he needed someone to pick
him up.

That he had left the party and had been in the front
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yard when the shootings occurred.
the fight started.

That he had been there when

That he had gone into the front yard and

that he had seen Zeke and Rafael shooting guns towards the
house.
Additionally on a different issue, it was discussed
at the bench, it ! s our position that the voir dire conducted by
the prosecution went beyond the purpose of voir dire and was
cross-examination designed more to interrupt the
THE COURT:

—

I stopped the cross-examinational aspects

of the voir dire, as you 1 11 recall, as soon as you called it to
my attention.

I told counsel she had gone beyond and asked you

to proceed where you were.
MR. HOWARD:

Judge, I believe some of the voir dire

that the prosecution engaged in subsequent to that was also in
the nature of cross-examination.
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

Subsequent -That's not my recollection.

But if it

was, I don't see that there's any harm because it could have
been asked as cross-examination in any event.

With reference

to the alleged spontaneous utterance, despite the fact that
counsel used exclusively leading questions to try to elicit
from the witness that there was a spontaneous component to the
statement he heard from another individual, that did not come
out.

The best we heard was that someone may have been startled

and there is a discrepancy as to what the timing of the
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statement was, whether it was some 9 to 12 minutes after the
episode or whether it was the next day.

There is no

opportunity for cross-examination, no opportunity for
confrontation of this witness.

It f s not the proper sort of

testimony that qualifies in this Court 1 s opinion as a
spontaneous utterance.

Adequate foundation was not laid.

Having said that, let's bring in the jury.
MR. HOWARD:

Your Honor, if I could briefly add to

this our position, and this is just for benefit of the record,
I apologize to the Court but our position would be that time
difference alluded to by the prosecution goes to credibility or
weight of the evidence not to the admissibility thereof.
THE COURT:

I understand.

If the witness had been

asked nonleading questions and had volunteered the timing and
the nature of the —

or the spontaneity of what was said it

would be a very different matter.

On the contrary, even though

he was led, he indicated that what James had told him was in
response to questions from him.

That it was not spontaneous

comments, and therefore that is one of the many things the
Court has considered.

Incidentally, the witness blurted out

the answer in any event.

And despite the fact that the Court

has asked the jury to disregard that, as we all know, once
something has been said it's very hard for people to forget
it's been said.

So frankly, the defense has managed to get in

the statement in any event.
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